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The Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Private Parties
An Overview from the Perspective of the Icc
Horacio A. GRIGERA NACN*
INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years or so, the flow of investment across frontiers has by far
exceeded the international flow of goods and, more generally, international trade flows.
The globalization of the world economy in more recent years has emphasized even
more a trend that had already taken firm roots.
The growth of foreign investment has been accompanied (perhaps one could say
triggered) by a Copernican change in the attitude of host countries-particularly, but
not exclusively, in the developing world-regarding the treatment and level of
protection to be afforded to foreign private investment. From positions clearly
adverse-for example, to granting foreign investment national treatment, treatment in
compliance with minimum international law standards or most-favoured-nation
treatment and other guarantees relating to money transfers, the payment of dividends or
the payment of compensation which was the case prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s-
developing countries have generally shifted in more recent years towards positions
favouring the grant of that type of protection or guarantee. In parallel, such countries
have shown willingness or agreed to drop certain requirements imposed on foreign
investors, such as a national presence on the Board of Directors or in the share capital
of foreign-owned companies, or the satisfaction of performance requirements or export
quotas. Since an integral part of the protective framework required by private investors
and espoused by industrialized countries-such as the United States includes access by
the private investor to international commercial arbitration to resolve claims against the
host country arising from its status as such or from the foreign investment, the new
attitude of developing countries has also been evidenced through their acceptance to
submit to binding arbitration should the private foreign investor opt for that means of
dispute resolution to obtain redress for his grievances. Such an acceptance is granted in
advance and becomes operational (normally before the dispute has arisen) as soon as the
legislation or the applicable international agreement incorporating such acceptance is, as
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the case may be, passed or ratified by such State or ratified by the State of origin of such
foreign investor (arbitration without privity).
Such developments have been mainly embodied either in legislation (e.g. foreign
investment laws) passed by host countries or in multilateral (e.g. the Energy Charter
Treaty), minilateral, plurilateral (e.g. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Chapter 11) or bilateral (e.g. bilateral investment treaties (BITS)) international treaties or
agreements ratified by different countries. Not too long ago, the World Bank estimated
that 1,100 BITs' involving both developing and developed countries (a substantial
number of them entered into exclusively between developing countries), which refer
to international commercial arbitration as one of the possible dispute settlement options
available to the private investor to handle its claims against the host State, had been
concluded. By now, this figure has certainly grown substantially.
The proliferation of this wide variety of legal instruments regarding the protection
of foreign investment raises a number of important questions, both in connection with
the level of protection to be afforded to foreign private investment and investors in host
countries and the methods for the settlement of disputes between States and private
parties arising out of foreign investment. Both aspects actually interact reciprocally. For
example, if this kind of dispute is to be handled by international dispute resolution
panels, it is more likely that the development of substantive law rules and principles
enjoying wide international recognition and consensus will be facilitated because of the
independence, delocalization and cultural neutrality of such mechanisms.
In this connection, international dispute settlement mechanisms are expected to
provide a legal and technical-instead of a political-approach to the resolution of
disputes regarding foreign investment. By advancing the resolution of disputes through
the furtherance of principles ofjustice rather than political accommodation (which may,
of course, be pursued in parallel by other means) private international dispute resolution
devices provide a better technical and appropriately depoliticized framework for the
development of substantive law and principles regarding foreign investment protection
likely to enjoy wide international consensus.
In any case, it would be a serious mistake to forget their reciprocal interaction when
considering the dispute resolution or the substantive law aspects of foreign investment
protection. The purpose of this article will, however, primarily be to deal with the
former as expressed in international agreements. No specific analysis will be made of
national legislation on foreign investment unilaterally providing for international means
for the resolution of disputes involving foreign investors and the host State. Some
reference will, however, be made to the impact of the chosen dispute settlement
mechanism on the applicable substantive law.
Among the substantive law questions, the elucidation of which will depend on
whether an international dispute resolution mechanism is to apply, are the following:
I See A. Parra, Provisions for the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 287, 1997, at
290.
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- do these new trends already constitute or evidence new international or
transnational law rules and principles governing the substantive and dispute
resolution aspects of the relationship between the host State and the private
investor?
- for the time being are these trends just the harbinger of a new international
legal order in the making in this area? or
- are these trends merely limited to setting aside or eroding certain principles or
doctrines (e.g. the Calvo doctrine) without thereby introducing in their place
and stead contrary or opposite principles enjoying world-wide consensus?
In the first two cases, one would be really facing new international law, either
already constituting a set of rules or principles or evidencing an incipient stage of their
formation premised upon the progressive identification of such rules or principles as
showing in bilateral and minilateral international agreements and, to a lesser extent,
investment laws or codes unilaterally enacted by different States providing for foreign
investment and investor guarantees and commercial arbitration for the resolution of
business disputes arising out of any breach of such guarantees. The foregoing poses, of
course, the question of the qualitative importance to be ascribed to these developments
in the formation of a new international or transnational law or of general principles of
law enjoying international consensus regarding foreign investment protection, not only
affecting the applicable substantive law but also concerning the dispute settlement
mechanisms available, or which should be made available, for resolving any potential
disputes originated in the application of this new "law".
In the last case, we would be facing a neutral legal vacuum to be filled either
through one-off negotiations of States and the exercise of their treaty making powers
within a bilateral, minilateral or plurilateral context, or even through the unilateral
adoption of legislation regarding foreign investment and the settlement of disputes
arising therefrom. Or the vacuum might be filled through multilateral negotiations,
which would possibly be more likely to give rise to a new international investment law
truly enjoying wide international consensus.
Whatever the case under consideration and the relative importance of different
legal sources in the formation or restatement of rules and principles prevailing or to
prevail in this legal field, the diversity of protagonists involved also raises the question
of whether it is appropriate to abandon the formation or firming up of such new rules
or principles in such a vital area to the disparate or isolated negotiations originating
bilateral or even minilateral or plurilateral treaties-often involving players of different
economic or political might or legal or negotiating sophistication. Perhaps it would be
more appropriate to have these negotiations take place on a multilateral basis, within the
larger context, for example, of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in
which case notjust South-North, but also North-North issues which may arise between
a private investor and a host State are to be dealt with or where traditionally South-
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North issues may be revisited or looked at anew from the perspective of North-North
concerns regarding not only the interests of the investment exporting sectors of
developed States but also of sectors of such States affected by foreign investment inflows
or other social sectors in developed States more indirectly concerned with investment
flows in one sense or another.
Thus, the participation in the negotiations of developed countries as a potential
host State (notjust as country of origin of an investor or holder of an investment)-most
of whom are organized on the basis of long or proven democratic traditions-may
facilitate bringing into the picture ideas advanced in or from such countries by different
interest groups or public opinion at large. These views might not necessarily represent
the views of such country's investment exporting or importing sector which might not
be otherwise sufficiently or articulately represented by or brought to bear on the State
officials at and behind the negotiations table if the latter were not carried out within a
broad multilateral context, or which otherwise would risk not being properly envisaged.
From a less ambitious perspective, such treaties may also play the role of establishing
maximum limitations on the type of concessions which may be unilaterally granted by
States in their bilateral arrangements, thus providing a ceiling for the special legal status,
including dispute resolution facilities, a private investor from a contracting country may
have access to within the context of bilateral or minilateral negotiations undertaken by
its country of origin, with prospective host States being a party to treaties establishing
such type of ceilings.
Historically, this has been a method propounded and sometimes implemented
within the context of regional economic co-operation projects in the 1970s and 1980s
in Latin America and Africa. It was inspired by the protectionist policies prevailing at
that time in order to unify external policies regarding, inter alia, the admission and
regulation of foreign investment and the creation of and access to the privileged status
reserved to regional multinational corporations and persons or entities investing or
having an interest in such corporations, which also included a number of tax, credit and
market access advantages.
A recent example in this respect is the Buenos Aires Protocol of 1994, entered into
within the context of MERCOSUR by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. This
Protocol introduces common rules with the express objective of establishing the
maximum level of concessions regarding the protection of foreign investment that may
be granted by a MIERCOSUR country for the protection of foreign investment under
international agreements or legislation which, as the case may be, is entered into or
enacted by a MERCOSUR country with or vis-a-vis non-MERCOSUR countries (Articles
1-2 of the Buenos Aires Protocol). Among other things, this Protocol provides for
international commercial arbitration, either institutional or ad hoc, for the settlement of
investment disputes arising between a MERCOSUR host country and a non-MERCOSUR
country foreign investor as one of the dispute resolution options available to the latter.
However, the Buenos Aires Protocol does not identify the arbitral institutional or ad hoc
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options under which the private investor claim may be heard (Section 2(H)(2) and (3)
of the Buenos Aires Protocol), since this Protocol only provides a ceiling on the scope
of protection to non-MERCOSUR country investors that may be granted, for example,
under the discrete investment treaties each Member country may conclude with non-
MERCOSUR countries and does not give rise to any specific rights from non-MERCOSUR
country investors to claim rights directly arising from this Protocol.2
The discussion of such matters, including the choice of the appropriate dispute
settlement mechanisms, within the broad multilateral context and under the umbrella
of recognized international fora eliciting the world-wide participation of sovereign
States in the debates and negotiations, should not only contribute to the legitimacy of
the new international or transnational law or set of widely recognized principles of law
regarding transnational investment resulting from such multilateral negotiations (or of
the existing international or transnational investment law and principles identified or
restated through such international agreements), but also facilitate the in-depth analysis
of the different economic and legal issues involved from a broad comparative
perspective and help to attenuate the impact of constraints originated in this or that
discrete economic or political situation or the relative strengths or weaknesses of this or
that player or region on the final outcome. The relatively larger transparency or
visibility within such a multilateral context as to the elaboration of solutions and the
decision-making process leading to them should also favour the broad international
acceptance of such substantive law and principles or of those revealed through decisions
made by dispute resolution mechanisms set up within the context of such multilateral
agreements. This type of multilateral approach would probably be more conducive to
laying the groundwork for a new international or transnational law of private
investment enjoying broad international consensus, including the dispute resolution
methods being a component of, or at least concomitant to, such international or
transnational law.
This article will first describe (in Part One) different aspects of international dispute
settlement mechanisms regarding foreign investment provided for in existing or draft
international agreements-multilateral or not-and consider in a comparative way
similarities and differences regarding the scope, operation and objectives of such
mechanisms as reflected in the different agreements or draft agreements being
considered. Such comparison will include an evaluation of the impact of the scope of
the international agreements being considered (bilateral, plurilateral, multilateral) and on
similarities or differences detected in the dispute settlement mechanisms available under
such agreements.
In Part Two, the article will describe the principle international arbitration
mechanisms at present being contemplated in international foreign investment
protection agreements. A final part (Part Three) will set forth conclusions on the
2 See H. Grigera Na6n, Foreign Investment Arbitration in Latin America: The New Environment, International
Counercial Arbitration Committee, ABA, Section of International Law and Practice, Newsletter, Vol. 1, Winter
1995, 14-23.
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importance of this kind of dispute resolution mechanism in facilitating the flow of
foreign investment across frontiers, and the convenience of permitting the parties to
investment disputes to choose among well-reputed and experience-tested international
institutional arbitration devices when the moment comes to advance their rights
through international arbitration.
PART ONE: Different Aspects of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in International
Investment Protection Agreements
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
Existing international agreements regarding investment protection may be broadly
characterized either as bilateral, as minilateral or as plunlateral. There is not yet a wide
range of multilateral agreements enjoying wide international consensus concerning
investment (see, however, as a serious attempt in this direction, the Energy Charter
Treaty). The Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment prepared by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development3 (MAI Draft), while yet on the drawing
board, was stalled as a result of a number of political and "national interest" reasons. The
1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (Icsiw Convention) is not really a multilateral treaty
concerning investment protection but a legal framework providing for mechanisms for
the resolution of disputes arising out of a foreign investment between the private
investor and the host country as a result of substantive guarantees, rights and obligations
not set out in the Convention. It will thus be considered as one of the vanous arbitration
systems or facilities available under the different international agreements regarding
investment protection.
Normally, there are certain important differences in the general aims and purposes
underlying bilateral and minilateral, plurilateral or multilateral investment treaties.
Whilst bilateral investment treaties generally only aim at providing specific solutions for
the protection of foreign investment within the bilateral context, minilateral or
plurilateral investment treaties are usually entered into within the larger framework of
regional economic co-operation or integration efforts among the Member countries
according to ideas of open regionalism 4 and should be seen, both as to their substantive
law provisions and dispute settlement mechanisms, from the broader perspective of the
other economic and commercial matters dealt with in such treaties, including the
methods for resolving or dealing with disputes related to such other matters. However,
the general approach to dealing with substantive foreign investment protection issues
and the dispute resolution mechanisms provided in such treaties is generally surprisingly
similar despite the existence of certain marked differences or particular traits.
In general terms, it may be safely stated that dispute settlement mechanisms in
DAFFE/MAI/NM(97)2, 1 October 1997.
See H. Grigera Na6n, Regionalism and the Transfer of Sovereignty, 27 Law & Policy in International Business
1073, 1996.
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multilateral, bilateral and minilateral investment agreements have been heavily
influenced by the pattern of bilateral investment treaties developed in the 19 80 s and
early 1990s. It is clear, for instance, that NAFTA Chapter 11 paid attention not only to
the U.S. Model BIT agreement but also to some specific examples of its application, as
for instance the Argentina-United States BIT entered into shortly before. The same
could be said in respect of MERCOSUR'S 1994 Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols,
respectively regarding foreign investment from one MERCOSUR country into another
and from a non-MERCOSUR country into a MERCOSUR country, and the Energy
Charter Treaty. However, minilateral agreements have also had considerable impact
on the formation of a new dispute settlement law regarding foreign investment by
creating a progeny of other international agreements closely following in their steps.
One example is Chapter xviI of the Treaty on Free Trade between Mexico, Colombia
and Venezuela (Treaty of Three) which in many ways is a replica of NAFTA Chapter 11.
It is also clear that the MAI Draft has been considerably influenced by NAFTA'S
Chapter 11.
A substantial number of bilateral investment treaties permit only the private
investor to choose the method of dispute resolution provided in the treaty that he will
resort to. The options offered are normally the courts of the host State or international
arbitration. However, the latter usually may only be resorted to after a cooling-off
period has elapsed. In many BITS, and also under NAFTA'S Chapter 11 (Article 1120) it
extends to six months or 180 days. Unusually, the Energy Charter Treaty limits this
period to three months only (Article 26(2)). The purpose of such period is to give room
for negotiations between the host State and the private investor to find an amicable
solution to the problem or to allow the host State to change the legislation or
administrative measures that gave rise to the claim. Certain treaties, particularly old
ones, only permitted resort to arbitration after exhaustion of local remedies before the
host State's administrative authorities or courts. In certain cases (e.g. BITs signed by
Argentina with, inter alia, Germany and the United Kingdom), the relevant treaty
provides for an eighteen-month cooling-off period in which the only option for the
private investor is to resort to the judiciary or the administrative authorities of the host
State to obtain redress for its grievances. Should such redress not be obtained through a
court decision, or should the decision obtained not resolve the dispute within such
period, then it is possible to elevate the claim to international commercial arbitration
under the respective treaty's provisions.
With some isolated exceptions, such does not seem to be the recent trend. Rather,
before resorting to arbitration or any other means of dispute resolution provided in the
treaty, most treaties indicate that the disputing parties should first attempt to resolve
their dispute amicably through "consultations" (e.g. Article ix(1) Argentina-Bolivia
BIT) or "consultation or negotiation" (e.g. Article 1118 NAFTA Chapter 11). None of
the treaties reviewed make any express reference to previous mediation or conciliation
with the intervention of a neutral acting as mediator or conciliator, though many of
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them (e.g. Article 26(2)(b) of the Energy Charter Treaty) foresee that the parties may
have agreed to "a dispute settlement procedure" (which may consist of arbitration or
mediation) not contemplated in the treaty.
After such a cooling-off period has elapsed, normally it is also for the private
investor to choose what type of dispute resolution method the private investor may wish
to have recourse to, e.g. adjudication by the courts of the host State or international
arbitration. As indicated before, the number of international agreements permitting such
choice also to the State party is relatively small (one additional example is Article Ix of
the Argentina-Bolivia BIT). Only exceptionally can such an option be made both by the
investor and the State party; in other cases the treaty is not clear as to the party entitled
to make such election or as to whether it may be exercised unilaterally by the claimant.
In one case, at least, if the claim has been introduced by the private investor and there
is no agreement with the respondent State on whether the claim should be submitted
to the courts of the host State or to international commercial arbitration, the choice of
the private claimant shall prevail (see Article ix(3) of the Argentina-Bolivia BIT).
The Argentina-United States BI provides a more particular solution. After a
dispute covered by the Treaty has arisen and once the cooling-off period of six months
has elapsed, the private investor may opt for any of the different arbitration alternatives
provided in the Treaty not when commencing the arbitration but at the prior stage of
consenting to "the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration"
which is a prerequisite to the actual initiation of arbitral proceedings. Once the private
investor has expressed such consent, either party to the dispute (the State or the private
investor) "may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the
consent" (Article vii(3), Argentina-United States BIT).
To opt for international arbitration or for court adjudication would normally mean
that such choice is final, and that the excluded alternative shall not apply. However, in
certain cases the answer is more nuanced. NAFTA Chapter 11 (Article 1121(b)) especially
provides that resorting to arbitration does not prevent the private claimant from
commencing proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief before
an administrative tribunal or court under the law of the disputing State party. This could
be interpreted as allowing the same private claimant to seek restitution (extraordinary
relief) before the courts and authorities of the host country and simultaneously pursue
damage compensation before an arbitral panel set up pursuant to Chapter 11.5
Additionally, under this Chapter 11 provision, and unlike most BITs, having initiated
proceedings before the courts of the host State does not prevent the private claimant
from resorting thereafter to international arbitration as provided in Chapter 11 at any
moment after withdrawing its court claims.
Save in exceptional cases like the ones mentioned above, should the private
investor opt for arbitration, it is also up to the private investor to choose what arbitration
' See G. Horlick and A. Marti, Nmir4 Chapter 11lB-A Private Right of Action to enforce Market Access through
Investments, 14 J. Int. Arb. 1, March 1997, p. 43, especially at 48-49.
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mechanism contemplated in the treaty should apply. The arbitral options available are
normally the ICSID arbitration system, including the ICSID Additional Facility when one
of the States party to the investment treaty has not ratified the IcsiD Convention, and
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules. Such is the case, for instance, of the Colonia Protocol (Article 9), of NAFTA
Chapter 11 (Article 1120) and of Chapter xvii of the Treaty of Three (Article 17-8(2)).
Other treaties also include the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration system
as one of the possible options (such is the case, for example, of sone U.K. BITs, of BITS
or economic co-operation agreements to which Cuba is a party, and a number of
national investment codes or laws). The United States-Republic of Haiti BIT permits
the private investor to opt for Icc dispute settlement mechanisms to handle the dispute,
i.e. Icc conciliation or arbitration. Article 11(2) of the Spain-Algeria BIT mentions Icc
arbitration among the options available to the foreign investor for the resolution of
investment disputes that may arise under this Treaty. In some cases, once the dispute has
arisen, the BIT permits both the claimant and the respondent to agree on a dispute
resolution method or type of arbitration not expressly contemplated in the treaty itself
(see, for example, the Argentina-United States BIT, Article vII(3)(IV)). 6 In addition to
the Icsio Convention, Icsio Additional Facility and UNCITRAL Rules alternatives, the
Energy Charter Treaty (Article 2 6(4)(c)) also permits the private investor to opt for
arbitration under the rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce.
B. CERTAIN SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS PROVIDED IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REGARDING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT PROTECTION
1. WHO IS "INVESTOR", WHO IS "STATE"?
Among the essential elements to be considered and that may differ from treaty to
treaty are the definitions of "investor" and "investment". Such definitions play an
essential role for determining the scope of dispute resolution mechanisms regarding
foreign investment in such treaties. Obviously, investors and investments not included
in such definitions will be excluded from the respective dispute resolution mechanisms.
Substantive definitions permitting characterization of who may be considered as
investor and therefore as potential claimant and who may be considered as host State
and therefore as potential respondent for procedural purposes, also has an obvious
influence on the determination of the sphere of application of dispute resolution
mechanisms available under the relevant treaty as well as the type of dispute resolution
option that may be resorted to. A number of treaties only confer standing to the central
government of the host State even when the actual recipient of the investment or the
6 See the corresponding texts attached to the article ofO.C. Unegbu, BITS and Icc Arbitration, 16J. Int. Arb.
2, June 1999, at 93-108.
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governmental unit, division or entity having originated the violation or breach from
which the dispute arises is institutionally, administratively, budgetarily and politically
independent from the central government. Thus, a violation incurred by a province or
state in a country organized as a federal State may well be only raised against the central
government of such State.
For that reason, Article 26(8) of the Energy Charter Treaty provides that an award
against a State regarding a dispute arising out of measures of a sub-national government
or authority of such State being a party to the dispute may only provide for damages
against such State and not specific performance. The provision is a wise one since it may
be impossible under the constitutional or public law of such State to compel such
government or authority to remove or modify the measure leading to the dispute or
occasioning the breach. As will be seen below, in all cases in which an award handed
down within the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 grants restitution of property or specific
performance, the defendant State may pay damage compensation instead. The MAI
Draft also provides that an arbitral tribunal acting within the context of the treaty may
grant:
"... restitution in kind in appropriate cases, provided that the Contracting Party may pay
pecuniary compensation in lieu thereof where restitution is not practicable . (Section 16,
p. 67).
In a number of treaties (e.g. NAFTA Chapter 11), private investors that may
introduce investment claims are only those having certain real attachments to a Member
country (a mere place of incorporation in a NAFTA country would not suffice, Article
1113(2)) and also not controlledby interests from third countries or countries not holding
diplomatic relations with or being the subject of economic sanctions from the host State,
which would be circumvented if the private investor had access to benefits under NAFTA
(Article 1113(1)). Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty provides similarly. It is
interesting to note that though the Treaty of Three follows NAFTA Chapter 11 closely, it
does not contain an equivalent provision. The provision in NAFTA Chapter 11 follows a
similar provision in the Argentina-United States BIT (Article I(2)). NAFTA Chapter 11
also permits a national of a host State to introduce a claim against such State if he is a
permanent resident in another Member State (Articles 201(1) and 1139).7 Such is also the
case of the Energy Charter Treaty (Article 1(7)(a)) and the MERCOSUR 1994 Colonia
Protocol referring to intra-MERCOSUR foreign investment (Article 1(2)(a)) though this
latter provision excludes nationals from another Member State who are permanent
residents of the Member State against which the claim is filed, unless it is proved that
resources invested come from abroad. A similar provision (establishing that the period of
residence in the host State must be at least two years) may be found in Article i(3) of the
Argentina-Bolivia BIT and Article i(5) of the Argentina-Chile BIT. Under NAFTA
Chapter 11 (Article 1139) and Chapter xvii of the Treaty of Three (Article 17-01), a
See Horlick and Marti, sipra, footnote 5.
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Member State may be also a foreign investor. This is not necessarily the case in other
treaties regarding investment protection.
These peculiarities may also affect the dispute resolution options available under
the respective treaty: specifically, arbitration under the ICSID Convention or under
ICSID's Additional Facility Rules may not take place if the private claimant is a national
of the host State even if he is a national of another Member State or is a juridical person
having the nationality of such State though being permanently based in another
Member State. Exceptionally, the ICSID Convention parties involved in the dispute may
agree that because of foreign control such juridical person should be treated as a national
of a Member State other than the host State, but if such is not the case, such company
may not commence ICSID Convention or ICsID Additional Facility arbitration against
such host State.' ICsI Convention and ICSID Additional Facility arbitrations are not
available either when both parties are States. It should be borne in mind in this respect
that a certain number of BITs, of minilateral treaties (e.g. the MERCOSUR 1994 Colonia
Protocol Article 6, and Buenos Aires Protocol (Article 2(F)) and even the Energy
Charter Treaty (Article 15) and the MAI Draft (Section 5, p. 54) authorize the
assignment by the private investor of all its rights against the host State to a Member
country or its designated agency which, under an indemnity or guarantee given in
respect of such investor or its investment by such Member country or agency, paid
compensation to indemnify such investor for damages arising from a taking or other
measure negatively affecting the private investor's rights. Such country or State agency
will be in the position of exercising all the rights of the covered investor against the host
State, including the rights to enforce such claims under the relevant treaty or agreement.
This could be a case of State-to-State claim that would not fall within the scope of either
the IcsIm Convention or ICSID Additional Facility arbitration. In such hypotheticals, the
investment claim will have to be taken to other options available under the relevant
investment treaty, such as Icc or UNCITRAL arbitrations.
Furthermore, it is legitimate to consider-if the topic is the treatment of foreign
investment and the relationship between the host State and the private investor within
the more general context of setting up or restating a body of international substantive
law and concomitant dispute settlement rules dealing more exhaustively with issues
arising out of such relationship-whether such treaties should not also be concerned
with the substantive obligations of a private investor vis-a-vis the host country, and the
remedies the latter may resort to should such obligations be breached or not duly
honoured. If such questions are considered, and substantive provisions in this respect are
incorporated or rendered applicable, it seems difficult not to consider as well the
methods of dispute resolution-domestic and international-the host State would be
entitled to access in order to seek redress for any wrongs it would have suffered from
See Parra, supra, footnote 1, page 324. Additionally, the sii Convention requires that both the State
disputing party and the State of the private investor be IcsIo Convention parties, and the Additional Facility Rules
that one of such countries be an P sis Convention Party (Article 25(2), ICsIm Convention; Article 2, Additional
Facility Rules; Parra, ibid., pp. 287, 299, 329 and 346).
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such infringements, and the mechanisms available to ensure that determinations in that
respect (judicial or arbitral) are effective and enforceable internationally or
extraterritorially. Such development would, of course, raise a myriad of issues as
interesting as difficult, such as the standing of the host State to act as plaintiff before
international instances, including international commercial arbitral tribunals, and the
obligation of the private investor to submit to international arbitration (if such is the
venue chosen by the claimant State) absent an arbitration agreement freely negotiated
and accepted by it, the identification of matters (maybe not all defined in or arising out
of the treaty) that may give rise to an international arbitral claim from the host State, the
level of co-operation and support of the authorities and courts of the State of origin of
the private investor in the conduct of arbitral proceedings introduced by the host State
and in the enforcement of arbitral orders, interim relief, summons, subpoenas,
determinations and awards issued in the course of or resulting from such proceedings.
In any case, even within the more reduced or less ambitious context of investment
protection provided by existing international agreements, some treaties permit the host
State to file an arbitral claim against the private investor (see, for instance, Article vil(3)
of the Argentina-United States BIT mentioned above). It is not clear, however, in view
of the fact that such agreements normally provide only for guarantees addressed to
private investors, what type of claim such could be.
One possibility could be seeking a declaratory award deciding that the host State is
not in breach of its obligations under the treaty. Another could be a counterclaim filed
by the host country against the foreign investor arising out of the same factual and legal
situation that already gave rise to a claim of such investor against the host State.
However, even in such a scenario, an additional complication may arise if the treaty does
not expressly provide that upon or prior to filing an arbitral claim against the host State
pursuant to the treaty, the private investor submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
intervening arbitral tribunal. This is established, for example, in NAFTA Chapter 11, but
only for the case of a claim introduced by the investor. NAFTA Article 1121 provides
that private investors submitting arbitral claims against a host State may only do so if they
also consent to arbitration under the treaty and waive their right to initiate or continue
any proceedings with respect to the protective measure such State is alleged to have
breached before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of such State or other
dispute settlement procedure. Absent a provision like that or an express submission by
the private investor, the latter could successfully object to be brought in as
counterdefendant in the arbitration it commenced. Another practical effect of this
submission by the private investor is to ensure that treaty provisions on consolidation
proceedings-which may lead to a private investor claimant being forced, at the
initiative of the defendant host State, into consolidated arbitration proceedings under
Nevertheless, absent a contrary mandatory rule or principle arising out of the relevant treaty itself, the
argument can be made that the State parties may introduce a counterclaim against the private investor claimant if
the applicable arbitration rules permit respondents to file counterclaims; see, for example, Article 5(5) and (6) of
the Ict Arbitration Rules. See, also, I. Shihata and A. Parra, The Experience of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, 14 Icsci Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 299, 1999, at 320.
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arbitration rules and with parties not originally envisaged by such investor when taking
the dispute to arbitration (Article 1126)-shall be applicable to such investor. A similar
consent from the private investor introducing an arbitral claim is required under Article
26(4) of the Energy Charter Treaty though this international instrument does not have
any provision on consolidation of arbitral proceedings involving a Member country and
a private investor."' The MAl Draft, which provides for consolidation provisions
(Section 9, p. 65), also establishes that the private investor submits to arbitration under
the treaty by filing its arbitral claim or through its advance written consent (Sections
4-5, p. 63). However, these international agreements do not seem to contemplate the
possibility of claims being introduced by the host State against covered private investors
under the applicable international dispute resolution mechanisms.
As indicated before, there are, however, treaties which provide for the right of any
party, including the host State, to introduce arbitral claims." Such international
agreements provide for the compulsory submission of the host State to international
arbitration but remain silent as to any obligation of the private investor to submit to
arbitration. Though authorizing the host State to file claims against such foreign
investors, they do not impose any obligation on the defendant investor to submit to
arbitration. Thus, there does not seem to exist sufficient assurance that, absent the
specific consent of the defendant investor, claims of host States shall be heard by
international arbitral tribunals set up within the context of such treaties or even that the
claimant State will be able to request and obtain the constitution of an arbitral tribunal
within such setting. Nevertheless, Article vu(3)(a)(ii) of the United States-Republic of
Haiti BIT of 13 December 1983 permits that once the investor party to the dispute has
consented to submit it to the International Chamber of Comnmerce-an option to be
exercised within six months after the dispute originated and so long as the dispute has
not been submitted to another previously agreed dispute resolution device or the
investor party did not resort to the courts of the State party (Article viII(3) of this
Treaty)-any party may institute proceedings before the Icc, and in case of
disagreement on the dispute settlement mechanisms (Icc arbitration or Icc
conciliation), the investor's preference as to arbitration or conciliation shall prevail.' 2
2. WHAT IS "INVESTMENT"?
As mentioned before, in this legal field, like in most others, issues of substantive
applicable law or principles are intimately associated with the effectiveness and scope of
the dispute settlement mechanism envisaged, for instance, by a discrete international
agreement or piece of national legislation (e.g. a foreign investment national code). As
an illustration, the scope of the definition of investment will necessarily circumscribe
1" See J. Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 I sin Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 232, 1995.
" See BITs between France on one side and Poland, Vietnam, Mongolia and Czechoslovakia on the other;
G. Burdeau, Nouvelles Perspectives pour I'Arbitrage dans le Contenticux Econonique Intiressant les Etats, Revue de
l'Arbitrage, 1995, at 3, 20.
2 See supra, footnote 6, and corresponding text.
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matters that are arbitrable under the dispute settlement mechanism which will become
operational and lead to the crafting of the applicable remedy in case of dispute. For
instance, the Argentina-United States BIT (Articles I and vii) permits in broad terms to
submit to international arbitration all sorts of contractual claims from the private
investor, including those arising out of loan agreements and all sorts of tangible and
intangible assets and rights. Equally broad is the definition of investment in Article 1(6)
of the Energy Charter Treaty. In the recent decision on jurisdictional matters rendered
by an ICSID arbitral panel interpreting the BIT of 22 October 1991 between the
Republic of Venezuela and the Kingdom of The Netherlands, "investment" was held
as covering all sorts of titles to money, including loans and portfolio investment. 13
The answer under NAFTA's Chapter 11 is much more qualified. For instance, claims
under loan agreements with a maturity of less than three years, or claims under loan
agreements to a State enterprise are not considered as foreign investment claims (see
NAFTA Article 1139). Claims under loan agreements to the State or a State enterprise
and claims regarding commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services and the
extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing,
are totally excluded from the Treaty of Three, Article 17-01, and thus may not be
submitted to dispute resolution mechanisms (including international commercial
arbitration) available to private investors under Chapter xvii of this Treaty. Though
provisions on investment protection and dispute resolution methods for investment
disputes in the Treaty of Three follow very closely and in most cases are identical with
similar provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11, there are also significant differences. One of
them is that Colombia has indicated that though it shall not adopt measures with respect
to nationalization, expropriation and compensation that are more restrictive than those
in effect at the time the Treaty of Three enters into force, it reserves in full its right to
apply Article 17-08 of this Treaty. The other contracting parties, Mexico and
Venezuela, have expressed that they shall apply the said Article only as of the time
Colombia shall have informed them that it has withdrawn its reservation (Annex to
Article 17-08). Specifically, Article 17-08 is a pivotal disposition of the Treaty of Three,
since it provides for the guarantee against expropriation and the criteria for fixing and
paying compensation therefor. This suggests that so long as this reservation shall not
have ceased to be effective, no disputes arising out of expropriation and corresponding
compensation may be taken to international commercial arbitration or any other dispute
resolution method contemplated under Chapter xvii of the Treaty of Three for settling
disputes between a private investor and a host Member State save the judiciary of the
host country.
The fact that the definition of investment may be extended in many BITs to
intellectual property, particularly when such treaties do not exclude certain remedies
from those that might be available to the private investor before international arbitral
tribunals-e.g. specific performance-may at least in theory render certain issues
1 FEDx N-V and the Republic of Venezuela, 37 ILM 1378, 1998.
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arbitrable, for example, the validity of intellectual rights and patent rights in respect of
the authority granting it and erga omnes-which might otherwise not be arbitrable before
an international, perhaps even a domestic tribunal if the definition of investment did not
extend to such type of rights. However, each treaty must be looked at on a case-by-case
basis, since each one responds to the discrete range of interests, national traditions and
bargaining power context underlying the participating countries and their negotiations
and may provide for different remedies in case of violations negatively affecting private
investors' rights.
Similar considerations apply to other delicate issues, such as whether the guarantee
or protection afforded by the investment treaty extends to the right of establishment of
a prospective investor or to what has been more broadly characterized as "market
access". A number of bilateral and minilateral treaties do provide protection for this type
of rights to prospective investors from Member countries seeking investment
opportunities in another Member country. The immediate question that arises is
whether a prospective private investor from a Member country may have direct access
to an international jurisdiction (e.g. international commercial arbitration) to seek redress
against the host Member State having curtailed or denied such investor's rights of
establishment or market access.
Whereas within the context of certain treaties such type of access is warranted-
e.g. the dispute settlement mechanism in Section B of NAFTA Chapter 11 covers any
claims under Section A thereof, including direct or indirect claims of investors on their
behalf or investors' claims on behalf of an enterprise of the other NAFTA party directly
or indirectly controlled by such investor (Articles 1116-1117) and claims related to the
fact that such investor or enterprise is seeking to make an investment in such NAFTA
party (see Article 1139) though Mexico and Canada have excluded market access to
certain areas from the dispute resolution mechanisms under Chapter 11 (see Annex
1138.2)-such possibility may not be taken for granted within the context of other
treaties guaranteeing market access. See, for example, the Argentina-United States BIT,
whose Article ii includes a guarantee to market access but whose Article vil excludes
from the notion of investment, for dispute resolution purposes, disputes not arising out
of or related to:
(i) an investment agreement between the host country and the private investor;
(ii) an investment authorization granted by such party's investment authority; or
(iii) an alleged breach of any right conferred under the treaty with respect to an
investment, this latter hypothesis apparently referring to a situation where an
investment has been already made in the host Member country.
The definition of investment and investor of a party under the Treaty of Three
(Article 17-01) does not authorize interpreting this Treaty as enabling a private investor
to file a market-access claim under any of the dispute resolution mechanisms for
resolving claims of private investors against a host Member State under Chapter XVII
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thereof. Article ImI(2) of the Argentina-Bolivia BIT very clearly states that investments
covered by the Treaty are only those that have been already admitted by the host
Member country. The same may be said of the Argentina-Chile BIT (Article 11(2)).
Finally, certain types of claims may not be handled under all the dispute settlement
options made available to the private investor or the disputing parties under the different
BITs or international agreements on foreign investment protection. For instance,
disputes on market access or admission or establishment of investments may not be
handled through IcsIm Convention arbitrations.1 4 Thus, the substantive definition of
investment also influences the type of dispute resolution mechanisms available under the
international agreement at stake.
The carving out of certain substantive law matters (environment, contractual
breaches not sufficiently related to investment issues, tax) also has an impact on the
dispute settlement mechanism and its sphere of application, as may be seen in NAFTA
Chapter 11. The presence and operation of a most-favoured-nation clause may be
construed and interpreted-depending on how it has been worded-as giving access to
a private investor in one investment protection treaty to methods of dispute resolution
more favourable to it envisaged in another investment protection treaty having the same
host State against which the claim is addressed as party but not the country of origin of
the private investor. In other treaties, claims that may be submitted to international
arbitration need not arise out of the breach of specific treaty provisions but may grow
out of the breach of investment agreements entered into with the private investor, of
investment authorizations granted to him or find their support in general legislation
related to or affecting foreign investment. Thus, no thorough assessment of the real
impact of dispute resolution provisions may be made if not considered against the
backdrop of the substantive provisions under the treaty in question or applicable because
of it. This may also concern provisions in the investment contract between the host
State and the private investor regarding resolution of disputes and their interaction with
dispute resolution provisions in the applicable investment treaty. For example, in a
recent preliminary decision on jurisdiction rendered by an lCsIo arbitral tribunal, it was
found that the choice-of-forum clause referring to the jurisdiction of the federal courts
of the State party to a concession agreement entered into with the foreign investor could
not prevail over the international arbitration options under the BIT between such State
and the country of such investor applicable to investment disputes when the investor's
claims fell within the scope of the BIT.1'
Finally, the nature of the claim may have an impact on the type of dispute
settlement option available under the relevant treaty, notwithstanding how broad the
definition of investments covered under such treaty might be. For example, the
Secretary-General of ICsIo may choose not to accept the registration of an arbitration
request if it arises under a transaction that cannot be characterized as an investment
14 See Parra, supra, footnote 1, at 287 and 325.
SLnco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICsI Case No. ABB/97/6 (unpublished). See chronicle at
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, International Bulletin, 3 November 1999.
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under the ICSID Convention (e.g. a sale of goods) though constituting a covered
investment under the applicable treaty. Also, IcsiD's Secretary-General would refuse to
approve agreements for the settlement of disputes under ICSID's Additional Facility
Rules if the transaction giving rise to the dispute is of "ordinary commercial" nature. 16
3. THE IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM ON THE APPLICABLE LAW
From a different angle and as mentioned above in the Introduction, the type of
dispute settlement mechanisms chosen by a claimant (as he is entitled in the large
majority of BITs and other international instruments) and the conflict-of-laws rules to
be observed by the selected (national or international) jurisdiction may affect the
applicable substantive law. In principle, opting for international commercial arbitration
as a dispute settlement method may have an impact on the way the dispute may or will
be resolved as to the merits. Because of its relatively delocalized nature and the fact that
under modern national legislations and treaties regarding international commercial
arbitration the means of reviewing arbitral awards on the merits are or may be reduced,
not available or deemed as waived, both the grounds for annulling or setting aside
arbitral awards and those for denying the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards or curtailing the extraterritorial effects of arbitral awards are limited. It is
generally admitted that international commercial arbitrators enjoy considerable
discretion when determining the law or rules of law applicable to the substance of the
dispute unless the parties have themselves settled such matters through a choice-of-law
stipulation.
In any case, international commercial arbitral tribunals have shown a clear
tendency towards assigning primary importance in the resolution of disputes to the text
of the contracts or legal instruments from which the dispute arises and to the analysis of
factual issues surrounding the dispute, as well as to the consideration of trade usages.
Often, international commercial arbitrators have decided that such elements, or a
combination of them, suffice for deciding the dispute without the need of identifying
the national, a-national, or international legal rules or principles which would apply.
Furthermore, international commercial arbitrators may feel more inclined not to
advance the application of domestic national law when clearly parochial and not
destined for or found appropriate to govern international commercial transactions. In
other opportunities, particularly within the context of State contracts or disputes to
which a State is a party, international arbitrators may be led to construing and
interpreting national applicable laws and even judge on whether they may be validly
applied or not in the light of general principles of law or of international law.
Most BITs and other international agreements regarding foreign investment
protection expressly provide, however, for conflict-of-laws rules which should be
observed both by the national (host State) jurisdiction or the arbitral tribunal called to
" See Shihata and Parra, supra, footnote 9, at 306-9; 344-5.
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decide the dispute. A substantial number of them indicate that the investment treaty
provisions, the laws of the host country (occasionally, including its conflict-of-laws
rules), the provisions of the applicable investment contract or authorization and
principles of international law shall apply, which means that national legal sources are
not likely to have absolute control on the resolution of the dispute on the merits.
Other agreements-as is the case, for instance, of NAFTA Chapter 11 (Article
1131), of Chapter xvii of the Treaty of Three, or the Energy Charter Treaty
(Article 17-20(1))-merely refer to the application of such treaty provisions and
principles of international law excluding any reference to any national law or the laws
of the host State. In such cases, it is clear that the application of international legal
sources will be privileged when it comes to deciding on the merits of the dispute.
Interestingly, the MAI Draft differentiates between disputes arising out of breach-of-
treaty provisions themselves-which are governed by the treaty as interpreted and
applied in accordance with the applicable rules of international law-and disputes
occasioned by a breach of the applicable investment agreement or authorization, which
shall be decided according to such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties to the
dispute. If they remain silent in this respect, the dispute will be decided in accordance
with the law of the Member country party to the dispute (including its rules on conflict
of laws), the law governing the authorization or agreement and such rules of
international law as may be applicable (MAl Draft, Section 14, p. 67).
C. "BILATERALISM", "MINILATERALISM", "PLURILATERALISM", "MULTILATERALISM"
AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
It would seem that minilateral, plurilateral or multilateral investment treaties-
though generally responding to the same pattern concerning dispute settlement
mechanisms foreseen in BITs-contain provisions regulating in a more thorough or
technically appropriate way than bilateral investment treaties, a number of important
matters having direct or indirect impact on the dispute resolution mechanism
contemplated in the treaty being considered. One of the reasons for such circumstances
may be the fact that negotiations among more than two parties take longer and lend
themselves better to analysing more carefully some of the implications deriving from
legislating or failing to legislate on certain matters from different technical angles, legal
and non-legal. Another factor is that, in such negotiations, the bargaining power of the
participants may be more evenly balanced or may provide for a better context for
alliances among the weaker parties vis-i-vis the stronger ones. The fact that those
participating in a plurilateral negotiation are all developing countries (e.g. the Group of
Three Treaty among Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela) may also have an impact.
However, no general rule may be detected or confirmed in this respect. For example,
as mentioned before, NAFTA Chapter 11 contains provisions on the type of investments
covered and the persons or entities qualifying as foreign investor considerably more
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nuanced or stringent than those of certain BITs. Nevertheless, there are BITs that are less
generous than NAFTA Chapter 11, as is the case of such treaties to which China is a party,
which reduce the scope of arbitrable matters to the determination of the compensation
payable in case of expropriation, and apparently exclude from arbitration issues related
to the validity or compatibility of the taking itself from the perspective of international
legal standards. If prospective investors to which NAFTA market access has been denied
are entitled to resort to arbitration, as also indicated before, that is certainly not the case
in a myriad of BITs. So, involvement in bilateral negotiations does not necessarily imply
that relatively weaker or developing host States shall grant larger concessions than if such
negotiations had been carried out on a more plurilateral or even on a multilateral basis.
Nevertheless, a minilateral foreign investment protection international agreement
such as NAFTA Chapter 11 excludes from international arbitration a number of
important issues which are then, in principle, left within the sphere of the jurisdiction
of the courts and authorities of the host countries.
In the first place, NAFTA Chapter 11 provides that certain measures taken by the
State remain outside or, in principle, are not covered by the Treaty and in consequence
may not fall under the dispute settlement mechanisms set forth in Chapter 11. Thus,
non-discriminatory measures of general application may not be considered an
expropriation of a debt security or loan covered by Chapter 11 solely on the ground that
it imposes costs on the debtor that cause it to default on the debt (Article 1110(8)).
Chapter 11 may not be construed as preventing a party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing environmental measures in agreement with Chapter 11 though it also
provides that Member countries may not encourage investment by relaxing domestic
health, safety or environmental measures (Article 1114). Protected investment does not
include money claims arising solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or
services or the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction except
for loans otherwise considered as a covered investment (see definition of "investment"
in Article 1139). This should be contrasted with the broader characterization in many
BITs of any type of contractual right as "investment".
There are also certain features affecting arbitral proceedings that are found within
the context of minilateral, plurilateral or multilateral treaties, that are normally absent
from BITs and that may be considered as primarily aimed at accommodating the
concerns of the host State that may become a disputing party to an international
arbitration under the relevant treaty.
For example, NAFTA Chapter 11 (Article 1116) provides for a limitation period of
three years after the investor first acquired or should have first acquired knowledge of
the alleged breach, for filing claims-arbitral or not-within the context of Chapter 11
and that it has incurred loss or damage (the MAI Draft proposes a five-year time-bar,
Section 4, p. 63). Thus, this provision not only introduces a time-bar on private
investors' claims but also establishes that there may not be a cause of action unless the
claimant investor has incurred loss or damage. The same approach is followed in the
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MAl Draft (Section 1(a), p. 62). Accordingly, the notice to be delivered by the disputing
investor to the defendant State communicating its intent to submit a claim to arbitration
must identify the relief sought and the approximate amount of damages claimed (Article
1119 Chapter 11; also in this sense, Section 4, MAl Draft, p. 63). Also, Article 1126 of
NAFTA Chapter 11 permits any disputing party, including a host State party to NAFTA,
to request consolidation of different arbitration proceedings. The MAI Draft also
provides for such consolidation (Section 9, p. 65).
In such hypotheses, under NAFTA Chapter 11 an arbitral tribunal is set up under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to determine whether different claims submitted to
arbitration against the same State by different private investors present questions of law
or fact in common and should therefore, in the interest of the fair resolution of the
claims, be heard and decided together, in full or in part, in one and the same arbitral
proceeding. This may render it easier for the host State to group in only one proceeding
the decision of the same issues raised by different parties, thus saving time, costs and the
risk of contradictory decisions regarding the same matters.
The MA! Draft shares this philosophy. However, under the MAl Draft it is only for
the State party to the dispute to request consolidation. Furthermore, consolidation
should take place as agreed by the parties, and absent such agreement, the consolidated
proceedings shall be handled under the available arbitration system under an MA! (ICSID
Convention, ICSID Additional Facility, Icc Arbitration Rules or UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules) to which the greatest number of arbitration parties had submitted claims or, if
there is an even distribution, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The arbitral panel
will have three members, and the arbitrators will be appointed under the general rules
of the MAI Draft, i.e. if the consolidated proceedings are administered under the ICSID
Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility or the UNCITRAL Rules, the appointing
authority will be IcsID's Secretary-General; if they are conducted according to the Icc
Arbitration Rules, the appointing authority will be the Icc International Court of
Arbitration (MAI Draft, Section 9, p. 65; Section 7(b), p. 64).
Within thirty days of submitting an arbitral claim under NAFTA Chapter 11, a
disputing party shall deliver to all parties to NAFTA written notice of the claim and
copies of all pleadings filed in the arbitration (Article 1127). Any State party may adopt
the role of anicus curiae in the course of an arbitration in which it is not a disputing
party in order to introduce submissions concerning the interpretation of NAFTA
(Article 1128). In this way, such State may influence the decision-making process
when it feels that a certain interpretation may affect its interests though the award
would not be binding on it and though a Chapter 11 award is made only in respect of
the particular case (Article 1136). Under the MAI Draft, it is for the arbitral tribunal,
once constituted, to notify the Parties Group of its formation. The tribunal may give
to any Member country requesting it an opportunity to submit written views on legal
issues in dispute, provided that the proceedings are not unduly delayed thereby. Any
Member country having requested the opportunity to present its views on issues in
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dispute in which it has a legal interest within thirty days after receipt by the Parties
Group of the notification of the tribunal's formation shall be granted such opportunity
(MAI Draft, Section 12, p. 66).
Both NAFTA Chapter 11 (Article 1133) and the MAI Draft (Section 5, p. 58) permit
arbitral tribunals operating under their rules to request, on their own initiative or if so
solicited by a disputing party, written reports from experts on any factual issue
concerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific matters raised by a disputing
party. This will permit an arbitral panel to duly take into account informed opinions on
vital matters that may affect the national communities directly or indirectly affected by
the dispute when preparing its award.
Furthermore, when a disputing party asserts as a defence that the measure alleged
to be in breach may not be arbitrated because it falls under the authorized reservations
or exceptions set out in Annexes i-iv, it may request an interpretation on the issue from
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission comprising cabinet-level representatives of the
Member countries (NAFTA Chapter 20, Article 2001 (1)), which is to be rendered within
a sixty-day period and shall be binding on the arbitral tribunal (Article 1132). Thus, a
State party may take the decision of such matters to an inter-governmental context-
since the Commission is composed of representatives from the Member countries-and
exclude it from the arbitral instance chosen and triggered by the private claimant.
Even if a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal may award restitution of property or
specific performance, the disputing host State may pay monetary damages plus interest
instead of restitution (Article 1135(1)(b)). As already pointed out, the MAI Draft has a
similar provision. Thus, the State being a disputing party is not bound to carry out
measures that may imply abdicating sovereign rights by compelling it to change its
legislation or State acts or ignore its court decisions in order not to incur international
responsibility for infringing its treaty obligations that may ensue should it not comply
with the award. Also, though a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal may issue interim
measures of protection, it may not order an attachment or enjoin the application of the
measure of the host State constituting the breach on which the private investor's claim
is based under Articles 1116 or 1117. Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals may not order a State
party to pay punitive damages either (Article 1135(3)).
Chapter 11 also provides for grace periods during which an award may not be
enforced after having been rendered. This is either one hundred and twenty days from
the date of the award rendered within the IcsIo Convention framework when its
revision or annulment has not been requested or so long as such revision or annulment
proceedings, if initiated by any disputing party, have not been completed; in all other
cases-awards made under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules-three months must have elapsed from the date of the award when
no disputing party has commenced proceedings to revise, set aside or annul the award
or, if initiated, so long as they shall have not been completed (Article 1136). This
provision gives breathing time to the State party to prepare for enforcement or to launch
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negotiations which may lead to an amicable settlement. Nevertheless, failure of a State
party to comply with an award within the prescribed time-limits will authorize the
Member country of origin of the private investor to request the Commission to
determine whether failure to abide by the final award is inconsistent with NAFTA
obligations and to recommend that such non-abiding State party comply with the award
(Article 1136(5)). Failure to do so will give rise to such State's responsibility under
public international law resulting from a violation of its treaty obligations.
All of the above NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions and similar provisions in Chapter
xvii of the Treaty of Three-negotiated within a minilateral context-may then be
regarded as aimed at taking care of certain important concerns of the State party and are
not normally found in BITs. Nevertheless, treaties negotiated, concluded and applying
within a truly multilateral context, such as the Energy Charter Treaty, do not always
contain similar provisions benefiting or likely to primarily benefit the disputing host
State. It is also interesting to note that Chapter 11 dispute resolution provisions crafted
within the context of negotiations between a developing country (Mexico) and two
developed countries (Canada and the United States) were largely found as substantially
appropriate to regulate essentially the same subject-matter within the context of Chapter
xvii of the Treaty of Three involving only developing countries. One wonders if it is
not at the level of this type of minilateral and potentially plurilateral or multilateral
context-for instance, if the NAFTA membership expands-that one should really be
looking for the incipient law on the resolution of investment disputes between a private
investor and a host country. The fact that the MAI Draft, whose negotiation was
undertaken within a multilateral context and is intended to have multilateral scope,
largely followed-as has been seen-the general orientation and many of the solutions
specified in NAFTA Chapter 11 and Chapter xvii of the Treaty of Three, may be seen
as a confirmation of this trend.
PART Two: Different Arbitration Options available under International Agreements on
Investment Protection
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
A survey of the different arbitration options available under the various
international bilateral or plurilateral agreements on foreign investment shows primarily
that they may be classified either as ad hoc or institutional arbitration options. This
analysis will be limited to the international arbitration options more currently found in
international agreements or foreign investment protection legislation. Of course,
arbitration options available under public international law to sovereign States only
regarding the interpretation or breach of investment treaties are excluded.
There is another qualitative difference between the arbitration devices that will be
examined. As it will be shown below, the ICSID Convention arbitration system is
incorporated into an international convention which isolates it within the sphere of
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application of such convention from the supervisory and review jurisdiction of national
State courts, including those of the country where the arbitration takes place, and
enables the recognition and enforcement of IcsiD Convention arbitration awards
without going through exequatur proceedings before the national courts of the ICSIm
Convention Member countries where such recognition or enforcement is sought.
Other forms of international commercial arbitration contemplated in BITs and other
international agreements, including Icsio Additional Facility Rules, UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and Icc Arbitration Facility Rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and
Icc Arbitration Rules, do not enjoy the same status. In principle, arbitration procedures
and awards rendered as a result of arbitrations conducted under such rules are subject to
the controls of State courts of the place of arbitration and subject to exequatur
proceedings in the country where enforcement is sought, normally when such country
is not the country where the award has been rendered. However, the following
considerations should be borne in mind:
Point 1: In a very important and increasing number of countries, controls on
arbitral awards rendered in such countries primarily as a result of
international commercial arbitration proceedings have been reduced to the
minimum needed to ensure that basic public policy principles and due
process principles are not violated. In some countries, the parties may enter
into exclusion agreements excepting in varying degrees awards rendered in
international commercial arbitrations from the controls of the courts of
such country (e.g. Switzerland, Belgium, England, Wales, Northern
Ireland and Peru). In parallel, interference of local courts in the conduct of
arbitration proceedings primarily related to international commercial
matters has been also reduced whereas the availability of State courts to
lend their support to international commercial arbitration (e.g. for
enforcing arbitral orders, including interim measures of protection) has
been expanded. One of the reasons for these developments is the world-
wide adoption by different national jurisdictions in both developed and
developing countries of UNCITRAL'S Model Law on Commercial
Arbitration or the main principles underlying this Model Law, which
should be considered as largely representing a global consensus as to the
level of controls that should be exercised on arbitral proceedings as well as
on the type and scope of support to be afforded by national judiciaries in
respect of international commercial arbitrations.
Point 2: There is a world-wide or regional ratification of major international
conventions facilitating or enhancing the extraterritorial recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards and the international effectiveness of
arbitration agreements. The most important example is the 1958 New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards. One regional example is the 1975 Panama Inter-American
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Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. Such conventions
introduce uniform criteria for ensuring the extraterritorial effectiveness of
arbitration agreements and facilitating and furthering the recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards by reducing controls exercised by the
courts of the country of recognition or enforcement on such awards to the
minimum needed to safeguard basic general principles of public policy and
due process concerns of such country. Such conventions, for example, do
away with the possibility that the courts of the country of enforcement
review the foreign award on the merits or resort to local or parochial
criteria to refuse recognition or enforcement of foreign awards.
Point 3: Provisions on the recognition or enforcement of foreign awards under
conventions such as those mentioned in Point 2 above, establish that
though arbitral awards are binding from the moment they have been
rendered, recognition or enforcement may be refused by the courts of the
country of enforcement if they have been set aside or if their enforcement
has been suspended by a decision of the courts of the country of rendition.
Nevertheless, such possibility seems to have been substantially reduced in
practice by the fact that, as indicated in Point 1 above, the wide adoption
of legislation such as UNCITRAL's Model Law in different national fora or
legislation inspired by its principles naturally leads to a reduction of
controls on awards available in the country of rendition and thus minimize
the possibility that such awards be set aside or its enforceability suspended
in such country. On the other hand, courts in certain national jurisdictions
(see for example, Sweden and France) have decided on the basis of Article
vii of the 1958 New York Convention or on other grounds that a foreign
award set aside abroad may be enforced in the forum if otherwise satisfying
such forum's requirements for the enforcement of awards rendered in
connection with international commercial arbitration disputes.17
Point 4: For the above reasons, many BITs and minilateral and multilateral
arbitration treaties provide that the consent to arbitrate from the host
country enshrined in the treaty and the specific consent from the private
investor to submit the dispute to arbitration given prior to or concomitant
with the filing of the arbitration request shall satisfy the requirements
applicable to arbitration agreements under, for example, the 1958 New
York Convention, or the 1975 Panama Inter-American Convention (see
NAFTA Chapter 11, Article 1122(2); Article vii (4)(b) of the
Argentina-United States BIT; Section 5 of MAI Draft, p. 63). Furthermore,
in order to ensure that the provisions of such conventions for the
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards shall apply at least in the
17 See J. Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annuilment (LS), 9 The Icc
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 1998, at 14-31.
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world-wide network of countries having ratified them, BITs and other
international agreements regarding foreign investment protection require
that the arbitral award be rendered in a country having ratified, one or
more such conventions, as the case may be, and that claims under such
investment treaties fall under the subject-matter covered by such
conventions and authorize the applicable disputing party to seek
enforcement of such award under any such conventions within their
respective territorial sphere of application (see NAFTA Chapter 11,
Articles 1130, 1136(6) and (7); Article vIl(5) of the Argentina-United
States BIT; Section 18 of the MAi Draft, p. 68).
B. MAIN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION
1. THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (the UNCITRAL Rules) is the more current ad hoc
commercial arbitration option found in BITs and minilateral, plurilateral and multilateral
international agreements on the resolution of investment disputes.
In general terms, ad hoc arbitration implies that the proceedings are conducted
without any supervision or support from a specialized institution which would be
charged with taking certain measures aimed at permitting the carrying out of the
arbitration within the self-contained framework of the arbitration rules provided by the
institution, that is to say, with no interference of State courts. In the case of institutional
arbitration, the institution is normally in charge of a number of tasks, such as selecting,
appointing or confirming arbitrators, taking care of the financial aspects of the
arbitration, such as the fixation of the advance on costs to cover administrative and
arbitral fees, the negotiation of fees with the arbitrators or the fixation of these and other
fees and cost advances on the basis of pre-ordained scales, the determination of such fees
and of the administrative fee at the end of the arbitration, deciding on challenges against
or replacement of arbitrators, generally supervising the integrity of the proceedings and
even scrutinizing the draft award or providing for the appointment of a panel to decide
on the annulment of an award having violated certain requirements set forth in the
applicable arbitral rules. It is currently held that the quality controls exercised by major
arbitral institutions primarily when choosing arbitrators or, in the case of the Icc system,
also when scrutinizing draft arbitral awards, and their proven track record when
supervising arbitral proceedings accounts for the judicial deference for institutional
arbitration when it comes to enforcing arbitral orders, determinations or awards.' 8
Additionally, experienced international arbitral institutions follow, on a day-to-day
basis, the proceedings and their pace and are instrumental in clarifying doubts that may
11 See G. Aksen, Ad Hoc versus Institutional Arbitration, 2 The Icc International Court of Arbitration Bulletin,
1991, at 8-14.
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arise at the level of the arbitrators and the parties as to the interpretation of the applicable
arbitration rules, as well as to explaining how to overcome certain procedural hurdles
that may arise. If needed, the attention of the arbitrators may also be drawn to the delays
provided in the rules that should be respected and fast-track or accelerated arbitral
proceedings may be facilitated.
The UNCITRAL Rules per se do not bring about the intervention of any support or
administered institution. Therefore, the type of help and supervision that is available
under institutional rules does not, in principle, exist unless the parties introduce through
their stipulations additional support for helping to administer the application of the
UNCITRAL Rules (for instance, by agreeing on an appointing authority). In fact, the Icc
may act as appointing authority in respect of arbitrations conducted under the
UNCITRAL Rules and has specific rules to such effect." One of the advantages
mentioned in favour of ad hoc arbitration, including the UNCITRAL Rules, is that it
would be less expensive since it does not require the payment of any administrative fees
to compensate for the Institution's services. However, the payment of such fees within
the context of an institutional arbitration brings in the additional, and not insignificant,
value of supervisory and support services provided by the institution itself On the other
hand, it is a generally accepted fact that the more substantial costs involved in an
international arbitration are lawyers' or counsels' fees rather than the fees paid to an
arbitral institution for its services or to arbitrators designated according to an arbitral
institution's rules.
Furthermore, the very fact that there is no institution administering the arbitration
may bring about negative economic and financial consequences. Unlike most
institutional arbitration rules, the UNCITRAL Rules do not have any fee scales attached
to them that would apply to calculate cost advances and arbitral fees. Therefore, it is for
the parties to an arbitration conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules to directly handle,
negotiate and agree among themselves and with the arbitrators, arbitral fees issues,
advances on costs, and the date of payment of fee advances and final fees. This type of
negotiation may give rise to delays in the commencement and normal development of
arbitral proceedings and lead to potential friction between parties and arbitrators. The
parties may be forced to accept economic conditions they would not have otherwise
been exposed to within the context of institutional arbitration. For example, should the
arbitral panel decide in the course of the arbitration that an increase in the cost advance
or that an advance on fees is needed, and should payment of such increase or such
advance not be made in full by the parties or any of them as and when required, if the
arbitrators refuse to continue their work the arbitration may be stalled. Under
institutional rules, according to which the institution would be called upon to
determine cost advances, fee advances and fees, there is no possibility for the arbitral
tribunal to utilize its position to its economic or financial advantage.
The UNCITRAL Rules do not identify the entity or person to act as appointing
'1 See Guide to Ice Arbitration, Ic Publication No. 448 (E), 1994, at 51-52.
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authority, or the authority which is to appoint arbitrators on behalf of the party which
has failed to do so and the authority that eventually may be also called upon to decide
on the challenge or removal of arbitrators. If the parties have failed to identify such
appointing authority, Article 6(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that any party may
request the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to
designate an appointing authority which would fulfill such functions. This may, of
course, be a reason for additional delays that would not occur had institutional
arbitration been chosen, since arbitral institutions directly and immediately play the role
of deciding issues concerning the appointment and removal of arbitrators.
Within the context of minilateral or plurilateral treaties regarding foreign
investment, some of these problems have been alleviated or resolved where the
UNCITRAL Rules apply within the context of the treaty (e.g. because they have been
chosen by the private claimant) to an arbitration commenced thereunder. Such is the
case of NAFTA Chapter 11 and of the Treaty of Three Chapter xvii. Since their
provisions are very similar, the following will only refer to NAFTA Chapter 11
provisions. The Secretary-General of IcSID will act as appointing authority should a
party fail to appoint an arbitrator or the disputing parties be unable to agree on a
presiding arbitrator and the UNCITRAi Rules (Article 1124). It will be also for ICSID'S
Secretary-General to appoint the members of the tribunal acting under the UNCITRAL
Rules eventually called to decide on the consolidation of arbitral proceedings and to
conduct the unified proceedings (Article 1125). It should be borne in mind, of course,
that ICSID's Secretary-General will play the same role should such appointments become
necessary if the private investor had opted for ICSID Convention or ICSID Special Facility
arbitration as also permitted by NAFTA Chapter 11. Under the UNCITRAL Rules, such
appointing authority would decide on any challenges against the challenged arbitrator
(Article 12(2)). Also, the schedule of fees of such appointing authority, if any, will be
utilized for determining arbitral fees (Article 39(2)). Nevertheless, other traits described
above that may still be perceived as disadvantages inherent in ad hoc arbitration
mechanisms such as the UNCITRAL Rules, like the absence of institutional support and
supervision in the course of arbitral proceedings, may still remain even within the
context of, say, NAFTA Chapter 11 or the Treaty of Three Chapter xviI.
2. IcsID ARBITRATION
Another of the dispute resolution options currently contemplated in BITs and in
minilateral or multilateral international agreements providing private investors with
direct access to international commercial arbitration for deciding disputes against a host
State is ICSID arbitration. Actually, this option is only open, as stated before, when the
State party to the dispute and the State of the private disputing party are States having
ratified the IcsIo Convention. Other limitations concerning the disputes susceptible to
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being decided through the Icsin Convention or IcsD Additional Facility arbitration
have been already considered in this article.
Arbitrations under the Icsin) Convention arc governed by the Convention's rules
and principles and by any procedural rules issued by IcsIm. It is a form of institutional
arbitration governed by an international treaty that isolates or detaches the arbitral
proceedings and the award from any national legal system, including the laws of the
country where the arbitration takes place. An ICSID Convention award is not subject to
any means of recourse or for setting it aside before national courts of ICSID Member
countries (Article 51(1), ICSID Convention). It may be only subject to annulment
proceedings for certain limited grounds set forth in the ICSID Convention itself (that the
tribunal was improperly constituted, that it manifestly exceeded its powers, that one of
its members was corrupt, that there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure or that the award failed to state the reasons on which it is based (Article 51(2))
before an ad hoc committee of three members set up by the Chairman of the IcsID
Administrative Council, who is also the Chairman of the World Bank. The decisions of
such committee, which may annul the award in full or in part, must be reasoned and are
final (Article 52(3)). ICSID Convention awards may be also revised by the same panel
having made them (or a new panel when referring the award to the old one is no longer
possible) if a fact unknown to the tribunal and the applicant when the award was made
decisively affects the award (Article 51(3)).
Awards made under the IcsID Convention are not subject to cxequatur proceedings
in any Convention Member country. This means that upon presentation of a copy of
the award certified by IcsI's Secretary-General, pecuniary obligations under the award
must receive enforcement as if decreed under a domestic court decision of the Member
country where recognition or enforcement is sought (Article 54). Nevertheless, matters
regarding sovereign State immunity as to enforcement are decided under the laws of the
forum where enforcement is to take place (Article 55). By submitting to arbitration
under the ICSID Convention, the investor's home State right to exercise diplomatic
protection or bring an international claim against a host State vis-a-vis the dispute is
suspended (Article 27(1)).
Failure to enforce an Icsin Convention award will be a breach of the Convention
which may lead to the responsibility of the non-complying State under public
international law. In such case, the investor's home State right to exercise diplomatic
protection is revived.2?1 Nevertheless, under BITs or other international agreements
referring to international commercial arbitration for resolving investment disputes (such
as NAFTA Chapter 11 or the MAI Draft), failure to enforce any arbitral award made under
one of the non-IcsIo-Convention arbitration mechanisms provided for in such
agreements or treaties (such as the IcsIm Additional Facility, UNCITRAL Rules or Icc
Arbitration Rules) may also lead to the international responsibility of the non-
complying Member State since non-enforcement would constitute the latter's breach of
2 Article 27(1) ICSID Convention; Parra, supra, footnote 1, at 313.
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its treaty obligations. However, if the applicable BIT or other international agreement
does not provide for the suspension of diplomatic protection from the investor's home
State along lines similar to Article 27 of the IcsiD Convention, such suspension will not
automatically apply if ICSID Convention arbitration is not resorted to in order to resolve
any private investor's possible claims. For instance, the Argentina-El Salvador BIT
(Article 10(6)) and the Argentina-Chile BIT (Article x(6)) provide that no diplomatic
channel discussions or diplomatic protection may be established or exercised by any
Member country so long as court or arbitral proceedings shall be underway between the
private investor and the host country except when the respective court decision or
arbitral award against the host State is not honoured.
In an IcSID arbitration, fees are calculated according to the ICSID Schedule of Fees
(1 July 1991). In this connection, it would be appropriate to refer to the words ofICSID'S
Deputy Secretary-General:
"For ICSID Convention proceedings, the fees set forth in the ICSID Schedule of Fees are,
strictly speaking, limits within which arbitrators can detennine their fees in the absence of
advance agreement on the matter between the tribunal and the parties (see ICSID
Convention, Article 60). In practice, in IcsID Convention proceedings, the fees set out in
the Schedule of Fees have come generally to be regarded as automatically applicable rates
which may be changed if the tribunal and the parties so agree in advance. This is reflected
in the drafting of the introductory phrase of the relevant provision of the IcsmD
Administrative and Financial Regulations (Regulation 14(1)). This practice is also reflected
in the Additional Facility Rules. See ICSID Additional Facility Administrative and Financial
Rules ... Article 6. Arbitrator fees higher than those specified in the IcsmD Schedule of Fees
have been agreed upon between tribunals and parties in six proceedings without, however,
changing the per diem basis for the calculation of the fees ... The fees of ICSID arbitrators
are thus calculated on a per diem basis rather than on ad valorem basis as under the Icc
Rules ... "21
For reasons explained above in the Introduction and in Part One, there may be
cases where neither the IcSIo Convention option, nor the IcsID Additional Facility
option, may be available under the applicable BIT or international agreement regarding
foreign investment protection. Additionally, the private investor or the State party
wishing to initiate arbitral proceedings may feel inclined to opt for a different form of
institutional arbitration. For example, the private investor may wish to resort to a more
supervised form of institutional arbitration or feel uncomfortable with the additional
opportunities to attack the award through potential revision or annulment, as permitted
for example under Articles 50 to 52 of the IcsID Convention, which would make such
annulment decisions immediately and automatically enforceable in all countries party to
the ICSID Convention without the need of going through enforcement or recognition
proceedings"2 (this latter feature does not apply to ICSID's Additional Facility
See Parra, supra, footnote 1, p. 310, notes 111-112.
Article 53(2), Icsli Convention. The consequences of the annulment of an award tinder the New York
Convention, Article v(1)(e), do not have the same extraterritorial effects according to certain interpretations of this
provision or if according to Article vii of this Convention a national law or treaty permitting the recognition or
enforcement of an award annulled in the country of origin applies.
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arbitrations, see Article 3 thereof); or wish to resort to arbitration rules permitting
arbitral panels to issue interim measures of protection-under Article 47 of the IcsIo
Convention, ICSID panels can only recommend such measures if any of the parties
objects, though there is evidence that IcsIo arbitral panels may be willing to decree such
interim measures irrespective of the objection raised by one of the partics. On the other
hand, under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, it is possible for an arbitral tribunal to
grant interim measures of protection (Article 47)-or not excluding the possibility of
resorting to court-ordered provisional measures;2 3 or prefer that the award be exposed
to the limited but sophisticated supervision that may be available before the courts of
the major national jurisdictions with experience in arbitration matters. It could also be
the case that the host State would not like to be subject to an arbitration mechanism
providing for an award that may become automatically effective without the need of
exequatur proceedings, as is actually possible under Article 53 of the IcsID Convention.
A host State may also be concerned, as the current literature on IcsID arbitration
suggests, with eventual economic pressures originating in the World Bank context
should it incur delays or refuse to spontaneously enforce an ICSID Convention or an
Icsio Additional Facility 3.
3. THE ICC ARBITRATION RULES
On 8 April 1997, the Council of the International Chamber of Commerce meeting
in Shanghai, China, adopted new Icc Arbitration Rules which came into effect on
1 January 1998 (the 1998 Rules, or the New Rules). The 1998 Rules-the final
product of two years' work-were prepared by the Icc Commission on International
Arbitration, in conjunction with the International Court of Arbitration of the Icc (the
Court) and also with the input from National Committees of the International Chamber
of Commerce from all over the world.
The 1998 Rules (Article 6(1)) apply to arbitrations commenced on or after
1 January 1998, unless the parties agree that the Icc arbitration rules in effect on the date
of their arbitration agreement shall apply.
The 1998 Rules maintain the basic features that have characterized the IcC
arbitration system since its inception in 1923, that is:
(i) the pivotal role played by the Court in the administration of arbitrations under
Icc arbitration rules in force from time to time throughout more than
seventy-seven years of existence, which includes confirming arbitrators and
scrutinizing draft arbitral awards as to form and points of substance before
being rendered; and
(ii) the flexibility and universality of the Icc arbitration system permitting Icc
23 Icsm Arbitration Rules (unlike other arbitration rules, e.g. ICc Arbitration Rules, Article 23) exclude court-
ordered provisional measures unless the parties have agreed otherwise. See Shihata and Parra, supra, footnote 9,
at 324.
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arbitrations to take place in any corner of the world, in any language and
against the backdrop of any legal system.
In this sense, the New Rules constitute an evolution rather than a revolution in
respect of the current text, that had not suffered any major modification since the last
substantial overhaul of the Icc Arbitration Rules in 1975. The New Rules are largely
the outcome of the experience gathered by the Court and its Secretariat since then and
a response to the needs of users. The New Rules incorporate existing practices, adapt
the Icc Arbitration Rules to certain developments in the field, introduce greater
flexibility and transparency and reduce or prevent delays in the administration and
conduct of Icc arbitrations.
The Icc arbitration system is one of the services rendered to the world's business
community by the Icc created in 1919. The Icc is the mouthpiece of world's business
interests and initiatives before national and international fora, including more recently
the World Trade Organization. It enjoys consultative status at the highest level with the
United Nations and its specialized agencies. It has National Committees in over seventy
different countries representing the respective local business communities. It also has
direct members from countries not having an Icc National Committee.
(a) The Court
The Court is an autonomous arbitration body attached to the Icc (Article 1(1),
New Rules). Each National Committee of the Icc may propose a member of the Court
to be appointed by the Icc Council, the supreme governing body within the Icc
(Article 3(3), Appendix r of the New Rules). The Court has, one hundred and two
members representing developed and developing countries alike and all cultures and
major legal systems. Its multinational and multicultural composition ensures that all
viewpoints and approaches are represented in the Court's debates and in the making of
the Court's determinations and decisions. Also, being an autonomous body, it carries
out its functions in complete independence from the Icc and its organs (Article 1(2),
Appendix I, New Rules). The Court members are independent from the National
Committees of the Icc, including the one having proposed them for appointment as
Court member (Article 1(3), Appendix I; Article 3(1), Appendix ii, New Rules). These
characteristics ensure the cultural neutrality and openness and the impartiality and
independence of the Court in the carrying out of its functions and when discharging its
duties. It also confirms the depoliticized nature of Icc arbitration, which is totally free
from any governmental or interest-group influence in its operation, organization and
decision-making.
The Court itself does not settle disputes (Article 1(2), New Rules). It does not hear
the parties to an arbitral dispute nor establish the facts of the case. Its central function is
to administer and supervise arbitrations conducted under the Icc Rules of Arbitration,
as a result of an agreement of the parties to that effect, by arbitrators chosen by the
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parties themselves or appointed, if they would fail to do so, according to the Icc
Arbitration Rules. The Court is entrusted with ensuring the application of the Icc
Arbitration Rules (Article 1(1), Appendix I, New Rules) so as to exercise appropriate
quality controls on the conduct of the arbitral proceedings and the award or awards
rendered by the arbitral tribunal. The controls exercised by the Court with the assistance
of its Secretariat aim at making the arbitral process and its outcome neutral, impartial
and reliable, so as to prompt the parties to spontaneously abide by the determinations
and decisions of the arbitral panel and, if need be, to ensure that the arbitral award shall
be enforceable at law before national courts (Article 35, New Rules). The Court
administers arbitrations concerning international business disputes but will also take care
of domestic business disputes if so agreed by the parties (Article 1(1), New Rules).
An c arbitrator must be independent from all parties to the dispute, including the
one having nominated him (Article 7(1), New Rules) and must also be able and
available to conduct the reference (Article 9(1), New Rules). Should any party fail to
nominate his arbitrator or should the parties not agree on the sole arbitrator or the
chairman of an arbitral panel, he will be appointed by the Court, normally at the
proposal of a National Committee of the Icc selected by the Court at the initiative of
the Court's Secretariat (Article 8, New Rules). There are no lists of Icc arbitrators and
each proposal, nomination and appointment of an arbitrator is done on a case-by-case
basis without the help of pre-established lists or rosters. To ensure that every arbitrator
is independent from all parties to the dispute he will only be appointed upon having
been confirmed by the Court or its Secretary-General (Article 9, New Rules), as the
case may be. Though the parties may contract out of the mechanisms for selecting and
appointing arbitrators under the Icc Arbitration Rules (Article 7(6), New Rules), they
cannot derogate from the cardinal principle that prospective arbitrators must be
independent from all the parties and, once appointed, must remain independent
throughout the arbitral proceedings. The Court will also determine the number of
arbitrators failing a stipulation or agreement between the parties in this respect
(Article 8(2), New Rules).
Another basic principle of the Icc arbitration system is that the fixation of advances
to cover arbitration costs and expenses (see a detailed explanation of how cost advances
are calculated and a practical example in the Annex to this article), i.e. administrative
fees to pay for the Court's and its Secretariat's services, arbitral fees and expenses
reimbursable to the arbitrators, as well as of such fees or expenses that ultimately will be
paid to the arbitrators or to the Icc for the Court's and its Secretariat's services,
correspond exclusively to the Court, which will make the respective calculations by
applying the fee tables set forth in Appendix III of the Icc Arbitration Rules to the
amount of the dispute.24 The fact that fees and cost advances are essentially determined
on the basis of disputed amounts has the advantage of permitting the parties to make
24 Further precisions on the handling ofcost issues related to Icr arbitration may be found in H. Grigera Na6n,
The Appendixes to the 1998 Ic Arbitration Rules, 8 The Icc International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 37, 1997.
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advance estimates (even before the commencement of the arbitration) of the costs
involved and also should discourage frivolous claims that normally lead to delays and
superfluous arbitral activity.
Separate fee arrangements between the parties and the arbitrators are contrary to
the Icc Arbitration Rules (Article 2(4), Appendix iii to the New Rules). This is one of
the important advantages of agreeing to Icc arbitration, since the parties and the
arbitrators shall not be exposed to potential animosities or painful bargaining that may
be associated with discussions or negotiations related to the financial and economic
aspects of an arbitration. Direct dealings of the parties in this respect may conspire
against the co-operative atmosphere necessary for the proper conduct of an arbitration,
and frequently lead to delays in the commencement and the continuation of the
reference.
The Court is also charged with deciding any recusations addressed against an
arbitrator for his lack of impartiality or independence (Article 11, New Rules). The
Court may-after hearing the parties and the arbitrators-also remove on its own
initiative an arbitrator who is prevented de iure or defacto from fulfilling his functions
(Article 12(2), New Rules).
When one of the parties questions the existence or the validity or the scope of an
arbitration clause or such matters are subject to doubt and one party has not answered
the arbitration request, the Icc Court will first consider whether it is prima facie
satisfied as to the existence of an arbitration agreement under the Icc Arbitration
Rules in order to determine, without needing to resort to a national court, if the
arbitration may proceed and the file sent to the arbitral tribunal. Decisions of the
Court on the existence of an arbitration clause are administrative in nature and its
reasons are not communicated. The fact that the Court is prima facie satisfied that an
Icc arbitration clause may exist does not prevent the intervening arbitral tribunal from
finally ruling on the existence or validity of the arbitral clause or the arbitrability of the
dispute. If the Court concludes that an arbitration clause may not exist under the icc
arbitration rules, any party retains the right to ask a court of law having jurisdiction
whether or not there is a binding arbitration agreement (Article 6(2), New Rules).
Though under the New Rules all determinations regarding the prima facie existence of
an Icc arbitration clause correspond exclusively to the Court, the Secretariat will
advise the Court on the parties' respective positions in this respect for it to decide on
this matter.
The Court fixes the place of the arbitration when the parties have not agreed on it
(Article 14(1), New Rules). This is also a vital function fulfilled by the Court in view
of the economic, operational and legal consequences flowing from such a choice or
fixation which, among other things, determines the national jurisdiction supervising the
conduct of the arbitration and providing for support regarding the enforcement of
orders issued or measures adopted by the arbitral tribunal, the means of recourse
available against or for setting aside the award, the place where the award has been
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rendered (Article 25(3), New Rules) and its enforceability under international
conventions, including the 1958 New York Convention on the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards.
The Court is also charged with approving the Terms of Reference if signed by the
arbitrators when one of the parties has failed to do so (Article 18(3), New Rules). This
is consistent with another vital principle of the Icc arbitration system, namely, that if
one of the parties refuses or fails to take part in the arbitration or any stage thereof, the
arbitration shall proceed notwithstanding such refusal or failure (Article 6(3), New
Rules). Nevertheless, non-participation of a party to an Icc arbitration does not release
the other party from the burden of arguing and proving its case. In such circumstances,
the arbitral tribunal is not discharged of its duty to "establish the facts of the case by all
appropriate means" as soon as possible (Article 20(1), New Rules) and to test the
arguments and allegations of the participating party against the evidence produced
during the course of the proceedings.
The Terms of Reference is a document containing a summary of the parties' claims
and counterclaims and defining the issues in dispute. It is based on the claim, answers to
the claim and counterclaims filed by the parties and their latest submissions before and
during the process of drafting this document, which is carried out by the arbitrators in
conjunction with the parties. It has the advantage of helping the parties and the
arbitrators to focus, at an early stage of the proceedings, on the controverted issues at
stake and the merits of the case. For that reason it helps the arbitral tribunal to avoid the
danger of not deciding issues actually submitted to it or of omitting to decide questions
the parties wanted it to decide, and the parties are aided in assessing their respective
strengths and weaknesses and eventually to settle their dispute. State parties to Icc
arbitration have often praised the Terms of Reference as a means of circumscribing and
clarifying the issues to be decided and facilitating settlement.
Only after the Terms of Reference have become effective may the actual arbitral
case be tried. In other words, it is only in the post-Terms of Reference stage that parties
and witnesses may be heard or summoned as to the merits of the dispute, evidence
produced, hearings held, expert evidence proposed and provided for, etc. Thus the
Court's powers to approve Terms of Reference and permit the case to advance to the
post-Terms of Reference stage, despite the sabotaging tactics of a recalcitrant party or
the lack of co-operation of the party absent from the proceedings, are of vital
importance.
Last, but certainly not least, the Court scrutinizes the arbitral award in draft form
both as to form and points of substance before approving it and having it communicated
to the parties. The purpose of this control is both to ensure the quality of the final
product of an Icc arbitration and to render it enforceable at law (Article 27, New
Rules). The Court does not act as an appeal or review board. It does not have the power
to set aside or annul the award.
All Icc awards are binding on the parties. By agreeing on Icc arbitration, the
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parties are not only deemed to have submitted themselves ipso facto to the Icc
Arbitration Rules but also undertake to carry out any award without delays and waive
any means of recourse in so far as such waiver can be validly made under the applicable
law (Articles 6(1) and 28(6), New Rules). Thus, Icc arbitral awards are final in the sense
that except for the possibility of being rectified in case of clerical errors or of being
interpreted by the same arbitral panel having rendered them (see Article 29 of the New
Rules) they are not open to any appeal or annulment procedures except to the extent
imposed by mandatory provisions of the applicable lex arbitrii. This is certainly another
reason why the scrutiny of the award is of such vital importance within the context of
the Icc arbitration system. Whilst the arbitral tribunal has the obligation to modify its
award according to the Court's remarks or indications regarding matters of form, it is
free to follow or not the Court's remarks as to points regarding the arbitral decision on
the merits. These latter remarks do not in any way compromise the freedom and
independence of the arbitrators to decide on the merits of the case. Remarks as to form
are aimed at ensuring that the award shall not present defects jeopardizing its validity or
enforceability. Their objective is to clear up any mathematical or clerical errors incurred
in the making of the award, to help identify and eliminate incoherences or
contradictions in the reasoning of the arbitrators, and to ensure that the award decides
all-neither less nor more-of the questions or issues submitted to the arbitral tribunal
(infra petita, plus petita), that is to say, the Terms of Reference and the mandate to the
arbitrators have been complied with. A draft award not modified to satisfy the Court's
observations as to form shall not be approved by the Court and may not become an Icc
award.
The guarantees provided by the Court's supervision of arbitral proceedings as to
independence, neutrality and respect of due process as well as to the quality of arbitral
awards, account for the fact that Icc arbitration is often resorted to by the developing
country party to the dispute and that Icc arbitral awards favourable to the developing
country claimant often have been enforced against the defendant by the court's of the
developed country of which such defendant is a national. 2s
(b) The Court's Secretariat
The Secretariat of the Court is composed of approximately fifty persons, at present
including twenty-two lawyers or holders of law degrees. As multicultural, depoliticized,
free from governmental and interest-group influences and multinational as the Court
itself, several different languages are spoken in the Court's Secretariat, including Arabic
and Cantonese. It is headed by a Secretary-General assisted in his functions by a Deputy
Secretary-General and a General Counsel. The Secretariat's fundamental role is to assist
the Court in the performance of its functions (Article 2, Appendix I to the New Rules).
2 See H. Grigera Na6n, ICC Arbitration and Developing Countries, 8 ICsID Review, Foreign Investment Law
Journal, 1993, at 116.
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Not only are the Secretariat's Icc arbitrations commenced by the filing of the arbitration
request, attached copies and documents with the Secretariat (Article 4(1), New Rules),
but also all notifications until the file has been transmitted to the arbitral tribunal are
made by or through the Secretariat of the Court.
The Secretariat at present comprises seven teams, each led by a Counsel holding a
law degree. When an arbitration request is filed, the Secretary-General will assign the
case to one of the seven teams. As from then, such team will be in charge of the
administration of the case. Each time the Court has to take a decision or make a
determination in the exercise of its powers under the Icc Arbitration Rules, it does so
on the basis of an agenda prepared by the Secretariat, which provides the Court with
the legal and factual context within which to adopt its decision. Normally, such agendas
include recommendations as to the decisions to be taken or the course of action to be
adopted by the Court in connection with the different issues arising out of the cases
submitted to icc arbitration. Such agendas treat matters as diverse as the confirmation
and appointment of arbitrators, the selection of National Committees of the Icc to be
invited to make proposals for appointing arbitrators, the financial and economic aspects
of the case (determination of cost advances and arbitral and administrative fees), joinder
of arbitral cases, primafacie existence of Icc arbitration clauses, the fixation of the place
of arbitration, the recusation or removal of arbitrators, the prolongation of delays to
finalize the Terms of Reference and render the final award, the approval of Terms of
Reference, and the approval of awards submitted in draft form to the Court. One of the
central duties of the Secretariat is then to analyse and study different aspects of the case
and assist the Court in the ensuing decision-making process.
Another vital duty of the Secretariat of the Court is to serve as the interface
between the arbitral tribunal and the parties on the one hand and the Court on the
other. As indicated before, the Court does not settle disputes or have any immediate
contact with the parties or the arbitrators. The Court's Secretariat, on the contrary, from
the beginning of the case is in direct contact with the parties, the arbitrators and the
National Committees of the Icc. In general terms, besides keeping the Court informed
about the pace and other aspects of the conduct of arbitrations under the Icc Arbitration
Rules, it is a source of information for parties and arbitrators on matters related to the
understanding of the Icc Arbitration Rules and the way they operate. Without
compromising its strict neutrality, the Secretariat of the Court does this through direct
exchanges with the parties and the arbitrators or through notes and other documents
issued by the Court's Secretariat, with the approval of the Court, for the information of
parties and arbitrators or as necessary for the proper conduct of arbitral proceedings
(Article 5(2), Appendix ii to the New Rules).
(c) The Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings
In general, the organization of Icc arbitral proceedings is left to the parties and the
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arbitrators. The Icc Arbitration Rules arc detached from any national procedural law.
When silent, the arbitral panel shall apply the procedural rules stipulated by the parties,
or if the parties failed to do so, those determined by the arbitral tribunal itself, which
may do so without necessarily referring to the rules of procedure of a national law
(Article 15(1), New Rules). The Icc Arbitration Rules are flexible and universal but
entrust the arbitrators with sufficient powers to adopt a pro-active approach to the
conduct of the arbitration, closer to the inquisitorial system characteristic of continental
law. For that reason, the Icc Arbitration Rules provide that lcc arbitrators have the
duty to establish the facts of the case by all appropriate means, may on their own
initiative summon the parties and witnesses (though at the request of any party they must
hear the parties), dispose the production of evidence, including expert evidence, and
order any party at any stage of the procedure to forward additional evidence (Article 20,
New Rules). They may also exclude the production of certain evidence and, within the
limits traced by the parties, determine the way in which parties and witnesses shall be
heard and questioned and the powers of the panel to establish limitations as to the length
of hearings and interrogatories. Unless otherwise requested by any of the parties, they
may decide on documents only. Icc arbitrators must state the reasons upon which their
award is based (Article 25(2), New Rules) and can only decide as amiable compositeurs or
ex aequo et bono if so expressly authorized by the parties (Article 17(3), New Rules). Icc
arbitrators may, at the request of a party, order any interim or conservatory measures
they deem appropriate either in the form of a procedural order or a partial award.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, even after the file has been transmitted to the arbitral
tribunal, any party may apply to a national judicial authority for interim or conservatory
measures without thereby repudiating the arbitration clause (Article 23, New Rules).
(d) The Internal Harmony of the Icc Arbitration System
The Icc international arbitration system is based on a number of carefully crafted
balances or compromises whose implementation largely depends on the wisdom and
experience of the Court and arbitral tribunals conducting arbitrations under the icc
Arbitration Rules. Such compromises and balances have been of paramount importance
for ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of Icc arbitrations at both the level of the
conduct and supervision of arbitral proceedings governed by the Icc Arbitration Rules,
and for securing the spontaneous compliance with or, exceptionally, the compulsory
recognition and enforcement of Icc arbitral awards.
The Icc Arbitration Rules maintain a careful balance between, on the one hand,
the freedom of the parties to structure their arbitral proceedings as they think it more
appropriate and, on the other, the presence of certain heteronomous provisions or
principles ingrained in the rules the parties and arbitrators have to abide by as a result of
the fact that the arbitral proceedings are governed by the Icc Arbitration Rules.
Consequently, there are a number of features of the Icc arbitration system that may not
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be contracted out by the parties and which may prompt the Court, if the parties have
indicated that such features shall not apply, to decide that there is not "an arbitration
agreement under the Rules" in the sense of Article 6(2) of the New Rules which would
lead the Court to inform the parties that the arbitration cannot proceed. Among such
mandatory features one should mention the powers of the Court and the Court's
Secretary-General to confirm arbitrators in order to make sure that they are
independent, able and available to conduct the reference (Articles 7(1), (2), (3) and (4),
9(1) and (2), New Rules), to decide on a challenge of an arbitrator, or to remove and
replace an arbitrator not independent or not impartial or not being de lure or defacto in
the position of fulfilling his obligations as such (Articles 11 and 12, New Rules); the
Terms of Reference (Article 18, New Rules) or the Court's powers regarding the
scrutiny of awards (Article 27, New Rules). Features that can be clearly contracted out
by the parties are any of the provisions of Articles 8 to 10 of the New Rules regarding
the number of arbitrators, the nomination and appointment of arbitrators and multiple-
party arbitration (Article 7(6), New Rules). But if Icc arbitration is one of the dispute
settlement options contemplated in an international foreign investment protection
agreement, it is also possible that certain provisions of the Ice arbitration rules be
excluded, superseded or complemented by provisions in such international agreements.
Such may be the case, inter alia, of provisions in such agreements providing for
consolidation of arbitral proceedings, limiting the powers of arbitral panels to grant
injunctive relief or interim measures of protection, or certain remedies, setting forth
special venues and means for the setting aside of awards, permitting the intervention, on
an amicus curiae basis, of non-parties to the arbitration, introducing rosters for the
selection of arbitrators.
The Icc Arbitration Rules also offer guidelines aimed at permitting the arbitral
panel and the parties to strike an appropriate balance between the powers of the panel
to conduct the arbitration and the rights of the parties in the course of arbitral
proceedings. Article 15(2) of the New Rules provides that in all cases the arbitral
tribunal shall "ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its case".
Accordingly, though each party is certainly entitled, as it may be deduced from the
remaining text of that very provision, to be treated in a fair and impartial way, which in
part means that the parties should be treated similarly in similar circumstances, none of
them may expect to have unlimited opportunities to be heard, produce evidence or
make submissions. The rights of the parties must be weighed against the necessary
powers needed by an arbitral tribunal to discharge its duties and conduct the arbitration
efficiently and in a cost-effective way. Also for this reason other provisions in the Icc
Arbitration Rules vest arbitrators with certain discretionary powers to conduct the
reference, such as Article 20(1) and (6) of the New Rules referred to above, or Article
21(3) of the New Rules indicating that the Arbitral Tribunal "shall be in full charge of
the hearings". Certainly, the exercise of such powers by the arbitral tribunal may not be
abusive or oblivious of the need of conducting the reference in a way leading to an
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award susceptible to receiving legal sanction. An imprudent decision depriving a party
of its opportunity to be heard, or to offer evidence in support of its case which is not
superfluous or cumulative with evidence already produced, may lead to the setting aside
or the non-enforcement of the award.
Finally, the Icc Arbitration Rules also establish a balance between, on the one
hand, the a-national nature of Icc arbitration proceedings and the freedom of the parties
to fashion such proceedings within the limits permitted by such rules, and on the other
the parties' expectations that the award shall receive legal sanction.
There are different provisions that express the autonomous nature of Icc
arbitration. Article 15(1) of the New Rules indicates that the proceedings before the
arbitral tribunal shall be governed by "these Rules" and subsidiarily by those fixed, in
that order, by the parties and the arbitral tribunal, "whether or not reference is thereby
made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration". As
mentioned before, Article 6(1) of the New Rules establish that the parties "shall be
deemed to have submitted ipso facto to the Rules" when they have agreed to submit to
Icc arbitration. Article 7(5) makes clear that "by accepting to serve, every arbitrator
undertakes to carry out his responsibilities in accordance with these Rules." No less
explicit is Article 28(6) of the New Rules, also referred to above, stating that Icc awards
are binding on the parties and that by submitting the dispute to Icc arbitration the
parties undertake to carry out any award without delay and shall be deemed to have
waived their right to any form of recourse in so far as such waiver can be validly made.
The provision regarding the criteria for fixing the rules of law governing the substance
of the dispute are equally detached from any national legal system or any specific choice-
of-law methodology, and also give the parties and the arbitrators sufficient freedom to
establish directly the substantive national or a-national legal rules they deem appropriate
to govern the dispute without resorting to a conflict-of-laws reasoning (Article 17, New
Rules).
However, limitations on such autonomy may be found in the requirement that Icc
awards should be enforceable before national courts, that is embodied in or underlying
different provisions of the New Rules. The fact that the waiver contained by Article
28(6) regarding means of recourse does not extend to those which may not be waived
under the applicable procedural law is already an indication in that sense. Similarly,
Article 35 of the New Rules exhorts Icc arbitrators and the Court to "make every effort
to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law" and Article 6 of Appendix ii to the
New Rules provides that the Court is to consider "to the extent practicable" the
mandatory law at the place of the arbitration. The most likely opportunities afforded by
the Icc Arbitration Rules for the Court to undertake such efforts are probably (but not
limited to) when the Court is to make decisions on the confirmation or appointment of
arbitrators, on their challenge or removal, when allowing an incomplete arbitral panel
to render an award in a "truncated" arbitral tribunal scenario (Article 12(5), New Rules)
or on the approval of draft awards. These provisions also call for a delicate balance to be
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struck between the autonomous nature of the IcC arbitration system vis-a-vis the
national legal orders and the unavoidable need to ensure its effectiveness and efficacy
despite the fact that arbitral panels are deprived of imperium.
(e) Icc Arbitration involving State Parties
The Icc arbitration system has had long experience in handling State party
arbitrations. In the past few years, despite growing privatization trends and free-market-
oriented State economic policies that have reduced the role of States as economic
operators, State parties acting as claimants or respondents in Icc arbitrations represent
approximately 10 percent of the parties to Icc arbitrations filed each year.
For that reason, historically Icc arbitral awards have evidenced or heralded
important trends regarding State contract arbitration in connection both with
procedural and substantive law aspects concerned by such type of arbitration. Thus, Icc
arbitral decisions regarding State contract disputes have significantly contributed to the
creation of a balanced framework for the resolution of such disputes based on principles
of fairness, good faith and a thorough consideration of the economic and other realities
involved.
For example, an Icc award has concluded that an agreement between a State and
a foreign private party, according to which the latter is entitled to certain payments, is
not a treaty under public international law---since it does not involve States acting in
their sovereign capacity on both sides-and thus does not require legal approval through
a legislative enactment from the State party to become valid and effective, irrespective
of how the agreement is designated or named and even if it contains a stipulation
providing that it is governed by general principles of law under Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court ofJustice.26 Other Icc awards, on the basis of the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz powers of Icc arbitrators to decide on their own jurisdiction, have decided
that international public policy is strongly opposed to conduct pursuant to which a State
organ which, when dealing with foreign private parties, enters in an open and
international manner into an arbitration clause on the basis of the trust of such parties
negotiating in good faith, but which either in the course of arbitral proceedings or when
enforcing the award, reneges on its word and avails itself of the nullity of its own
undertakings. These awards advance the principle that the State party has a good faith
duty to disclose to the other party the legal requirements to be satisfied for its
engagements to become binding, including legal or administrative procedures or
approvals." Icc arbitration awards have also refused the sovereign immunity defence
raised by a State on the argument that the sovereign immunity theory could not apply
either under national or public international law when the sovereign State was not
submitting to the State courts of another State and also because it would imply ignoring
26 Icc Award in Case 3327 of 1981, 1 Collection of Icc Arbitral Awards 433, 1990.
2 Icc Award in Case 1939 of 1971. See references in i Collection of Icc Arbitral Awards 222, 251 and 284,
1990; Icc Award in Case 4381 of 1986, i Collection of Icc Arbitral Awards 263, 1994.
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the authority of arbitrators, which rests upon stipulations of the parties referring the
dispute to arbitration and which, being of binding nature, constitutes a waiver of
immunity. The notion of sovereign immunity would be also alien to the notion of
voluntary submission to arbitration, since it is based on the idea of preserving the
equality of States, which is not affected when submitting to a private arbitration tribunal,
which is not a State administrative or judicial authority. 28 Icc arbitration awards have
also given effect to stabilization clauses agreed by the parties when such is the conclusion
to be reached on the basis of the combined application of different clauses in the same
contract referring to a national law and general principles of law and if the purpose of
such clause was to avoid the risk of a unilateral modification by the State of the State
party of its laws, thus disrupting the contractual equilibrium relied upon by the parties
when entering into the transaction.29
Icc arbitration awards have also been sensitive to the special realities or
circumstances affecting State parties or to their positions. For example, in a case
involving a developing African State party to a mineral exploration contract with a
German private party, the Arbitral Tribunal found that in view of the technical
inequality between the State party and the private party, the latter, being in possession
of the necessary technical expertise, had the duty to share it with the State party for it
to be able to evaluate the rights and obligations actually undertaken under the
contractual agreements being considered and to refrain from exerting pressure on the
State party to force it into the contract, without allowing the developing State to seek
or find proper advice. Those duties on the part of the private party are particularly
important when-as was the case-the contractual relationship could be characterized
as an international economic co-operation agreement. In such a context, the generally
accepted principle of law imposing the obligation to act loyally in contractual
agreements is of essential importance within the context of international economic
relationships. For this reason, the presumption of equality between contracting parties
does not apply when one of them lacks appropriate technical expertise and the party
possessing it does not properly disclose relevant aspects of a technical nature. 30
Icc awards have been also careful to properly consider the particular legal
framework defining a role of States when executing contractual agreements. For
instance, a recent Icc award decided that the fact that a State representative signs a
contractual agreement on behalf of a State does not bind the State as a party to the
contract if such representative's signature has been affixed below the legend "approved
and endorsed" though such representative has also separately signed the contract on
behalf of the State oil company of such State. The Arbitral Tribunal concluded that
when signing on behalf of the State, the representative was not engaging it as a party to
21 Award in Icc Case 2321 of 1974, 1 Collection of Icc Arbitral Awards 8, 1990. More recently in the same
sense, Icc Award in Case 8035 of 1995, 4 Journal de Droit International 1040, 1997.
29 Award in Icc Case 3380 of 1980, 1 Collection ofle c Arbitral Awards 412, 1990.
" Award in Ite Case 5030 of 1992, Il1 Collection of Icc Arbitral Awards 475, 1997.
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the contract but was only expressing such State's authorization for its State oil company
to be bound by the contractual provisions. 1
It should be also noted that in the context of Icc arbitrations, developing States do
plead the application of general principles of law, including general principles on
international contractual obligations, such as the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, and that their pleadings may be crowned with success, as proved
by a recent Icc award.32 This suggests that when arbitrating within the Icc context,
State parties are confident that a fair and just decision of disputes may be obtained even
if not necessarily or exclusively based on the application of their national law.
PART THREE: Conclusions
Current trends indicate that international commercial arbitration is the most
favoured non-judicial dispute resolution alternative available in the different
international agreements or treaties regarding foreign investment protection. As the
number of such treaties and agreements, as well as the substantive matters covered by
them, are likely to expand, one should expect that the importance of international
commercial arbitration for the resolution of foreign or international investment disputes
between the host country and the foreign investor will grow accordingly.
One of the main advantages of international commercial arbitration, together, inter
alia, with its neutrality and specialization, is its flexibility and ability to adapt to the
specific traits of each discrete dispute. It has been said that each arbitration is held within
a mcrocultural environment determined by the characteristics of the parties and the
dispute. 33 Such flexibility should permit the panel and the arbitral proceedings to be
tailor-made in agreement with such environment. Experience shows that when such an
objective is attained, the arbitral proceedings develop more swiftly and the chances of a
spontaneous enforcement of the ensuing award by the losing party are enhanced, since
the parties rely upon the neutral and evenhanded nature of the process and are
favourably predisposed to abide by its outcome when they perceive that the process is
fair and efficient. Nothing has been better adapted to meet the varying demands posed
by the settlement of foreign investment disputes.
Though the importance of ad hoc arbitration options may not be denied,
international institutional arbitration, by providing the support of an international,
culturally neutral, experienced and specialized body, entrusted in varying degrees
according to the different institutions with powers to supervise and organize the
proceedings and their outcome as well as to help overcoming hurdles likely to stall
arbitral proceedings without external interference, appears to be the best adapted to
meet the expectations of host States and private investors alike regarding the
1 Icc Award in Case 8035 of 1995, referred to supra, footnote 28.2 See, for example, award rendered in [cc Case 7110 of 1995, 10 The [la International Court of Arbitration
Bulletin 39, 1999.
33 See J. Paulsson, Different Approaches to International Arbitration Procedures, 17, 19 ADR Currents, Fall 1996.
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independence, expediency and efficacy of arbitral proceedings for settling foreign
investment disputes.
Within the context of international agreements on investment protection, such
objective is also furthered by permitting disputing parties to choose among different and
reputable arbitration facilities; as it has been shown to some extent in this study, each
arbitration facility has its own individuality and offers what may be characterized as a
different "product". Permitting private and State disputing parties to make informed
choices under agreements for the protection of foreign investment regarding the
settlement of disputes through international commercial arbitration-preferably of an
institutional character-can only redound to the benefit of the peaceful and swift
resolution of disputes between the private investor and the host country that may arise
thereunder, and thus help to settle this type of dispute within a neutral, efficient,
effective and depoliticized framework, which invariably is one of the paramount
objectives of such agreements. It is also such a framework, as contended in this article,
which is at present the most appropriate for permitting the proper application and
development of existing, incipient or new rules and principles on foreign investment
protection enjoying or aspiring to enjoy wide international consensus.
Annex
THE COSTS OF IcC AnBITRATION
Advance on costs: who pays?
The advance on costs is payable in equal shares by the Claimant and the Respondent. In certain
circumstances, the Court may fix separate advances in respect of a principal claim and a counterclaim.
A provisional advance intended to cover the costs of the arbitration until the Terms of Reference has
been drawn up may, however, be requested from the Claimant. The amount of this provisional
advance will be credited to the Claimant's share of the advance on costs.
Payment is staggered as follows:
- US$ 2,500 is payable with the Request for Arbitration;
- after a review of the Request, the Secretary-General may request the Claimant to pay a
provisional advance;
- as soon as practicable, the Court fixes the advance on costs to be paid in equal shares by
Claimant and Respondent (the amount of the provisional advance that has already been
paid, which includes the initial US$ 2,500, is credited to the Claimant's share).
If the Claimant or the Respondent pays its share and the other refuses to pay, the former will be
invited to pay on behalf of the latter. A party that has already paid in full its share of the advance on
costs may pay the unpaid portion of the advance owed by the defaulting party by posting a bank
guarantee.
The fees of the arbitrators and the Icc administrative costs are fixed by the Court at the end of
the proceedings. In its Award the Arbitral Tribunal decides which of the parties shall bear the costs of
the arbitration or in what proportions the costs shall be borne by the parties.
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT
Advances on costs: examples
The following examples are given for illustrative purposes only, and do not bind the Icc Court.
Example I
The total amount of claims and counterclaims is USS 1,000,000; the controversy is to be settled
by a sole arbitrator.
The advance on costs might be fixed as follows:
- administrative expenses US$ 16,800
- arbitrators estimated fees US$ 32,375
(minimum US$ 11,250/maximum US$ 53,500)
- expenses (travel, hotel, meeting rooms, etc.) US$ 4,825
TOTAL US$ 54,000
To sum up, for a dispute of one million dollars, settled by a single arbitrator, the advance on costs
may amount to some US$ 54,000, that is: 5.4 percent of the amount in dispute.
Example 2
The total amount of claims and counterclaims is US$ 25,000,000; the case is to be settled by three
arbitrators:
The advance on costs might be fixed as follows:
- administrative costs US$ 42,800
- arbitrators's estimated fees (US$ 98,875 X 3) US$ 296,625
(per arbitrator: minimum US$ 36,250/maximum US$ 161,500)
- expenses (travel, hotel, meeting rooms, etc.) US$ 15,557
TOTAL US$ 355,000
To sum up, for a dispute of 25 million dollars, the advance on costs may amount to US$ 355,000,
that is: 1.4 percent of the amount in dispute.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
PART ONE: Different Aspects of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in International
Investment Protection Agreements
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
B. CERTAIN SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS PROVIDED IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REGARDING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT PROTECTION
1. WHO IS "INVESTOR", WHO IS "STATE"?
2. WHAT IS "INVESTMENT"?
3. THE IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM ON THE APPLICABLE
LAW
102
THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
C. "BILATERALISM", "MINILATERALISM", "PLURILATERALISM", "MULTILATERALISM"
AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PART Two: Different Arbitration Options available under International Agreements on
Investment Protection
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
B. MAIN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION
1. THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES
2. ICSID ARBITRATION
3. THE ICC ARBITRATION RULES
(a) The Court
(b) The Court's Secretariat
(c) The Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings
(d) The International Harmony of the Icc Arbitration System
(e) Icc Arbitration involving State Parties
PART THREE: Conclusions
Annex
103
